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The cyclical nature of Soviet interest in peaceful co-
existence and detente is demonstrated by the 1955 Geneva
summit, the 1959 "spirit of Camp David/' the 1963 Moscow
accords, the detente of the SALT I period, and the renewed
Soviet interest in detente as a prelude to the signing of
the SALT II agreement. The Soviet Union's continual return
to detente with the West results from the confluence of
such factors as: the strategic balance, concerns for Euro-
pean security, the Sino-Soviet conflict, economic problems,
and bureaucratic politics. Two common elements thread
their way through each of the detente periods : Soviet
security concerns and opportunism. Each period of detente
countered a number of threats to Soviet security, lessened
the free world's perception of the Soviet threat, allowed
Soviet access to western technology, and permitted the Soviet
Union to improve her "image" through peace propaganda. U.S.
policymakers must be aware of the factors influencing the
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I. INTRODUCTION
I cannot forecast to you the actions of Russia.
It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma;
but perhaps there is a key . That key is Russian
national interest . 1 [emphasis added]
The purpose of this study is to identify and analyze the
political, ideological, economic and military factors which
have motivated the Soviet leaders to pursue foreign policies
of peaceful coexistence and detente during discrete periods
over the past twenty-five years. These discrete periods of
heightened Soviet interest in peaceful coexistence can be
identified by certain key events which appeared to embody
this interest: the Geneva summit meeting of 1955, the trip
by Khrushchev to the U.S. in 1959 and the resulting "spirit
of Camp David," the signing of a group of tension reducing
agreements by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. in Moscow in 196 3, and
the period of the strategic arms limitations talks and the
2
signing of the SALT I agreements in 1972. While the purpose
Winston Churchill, Radio Broadcast on the Nazi-Soviet
Non-aggression Pact, October 1, 1939. Reprinted in The
Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1948),
p. 449.
2 ...While the periodization in this study is unique. I must
give credit to the following authors for their earlier attempts
at periodization of Soviet interest in detente: Thomas Wolfe,
Soviet Power and Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,
1970); Malcolm MacKintosh, "Three Detentes 1955-1964,"
Detente: Cold War Strategies in Transition , edited by Dulles
and Crane, (New York: Praeger, 1965); and Albert Weeks,
The Troubled Detente (New York: NYU Press, 1976).

of this analysis is not to predict future Soviet behavior,
it is hoped that by developing an understanding of the
factors which affected Soviet foreign policy formulation
in the past, the reader will gain an insight into how these
factors might be utilized to encourage the Soviet leadership
to follow policies more compatible with the western under-
standing of how nations ought to live and work together.
A. VARIOUS APPROACHES TO ANALYZING SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
Many outstanding scholars have written on the subject of
why nations act the way they do. Variables have been iden-
tified, models have been developed, and numerous theories
3have been expounded. Unfortunately, there are no confirmed
theories, and there is no general agreement on the universal
validity of any specific approach to analyzing a nation's
foreign policy. Whereas in the physical sciences researchers
usually develop a hypothesis and then collect data to either
confirm or disprove it, in the social sciences the opposite
is more often the case: the data is history, and analysts
are faced with the problem of developing a framework within
which to explain what has already happened. The interest
shown by the Soviet Union in detente over the past twenty-
five years is a case in point. The facts are history. The
underlying motivations are waiting to be discovered.
3 •For example, see Daniel Bell, "10 Theories in Search ot
Reality: Problems of Predicting Soviet Behavior," World
Politics, April 1958, pp. 315-353.

There are a number of different general schools of
thought which deal with the question "why nations act,"
each of which has been applied to the Soviet case. The
realist school is concerned with the interaction of nation-
states in their pursuit of power, the system theorists
strive to identify the nature of the international system
in an attempt to understand the actions of the individual
actors, and the foreign policy analysts try to explain varia-
tions in a state's foreign policy output by examining domestic
factors. Unfortunately, there is no grand conceptual frame-
work which can be applied universally, and the selection of
a suitable framework for analysis becomes dependent on the
type of behavior being analyzed, the availability of data,
and the preconceptions of the analyst.
Historically, three models of analyzing Soviet foreign
policy behavior have received extensive use: the ideological
model, the totalitarian model, and the historical Russian
(national interest) model.
The ideological model assumed that since all Soviet
decisions were couched in terms of Marxist-Leninist doctrine,
therein lay the key to understanding and predicting Soviet
4For several explanations, see Maurice East, et al
.
,
Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for Comparative




foreign policy. One had only to study the writings of
Marx and Lenin in order to find the motivating principles.
The totalitarian model viewed the Soviet Union as a
country with an absolute dictatorship, with all decisions
emanating from the top. This model attempted to psycho-
analyze the dictator, establish his cultural and environ-
mental conditioning factors, and then use the sum of this
information to analyze the dictator and his decisions. While
this model found limited applicability during the one man
rule of the Stalinist era, the collective and consensus
leadership styles of Khrushchev and Brezhnev seemingly
invalidate this approach.
The historical model assumes that there is a high degree
of continuity in foreign policy goals, and that by under-
standing the events of the past predictions can be made about
future actions of the Soviet Union. This model also implies
that regardless of the form of government (tsarist or
A sample of writings stressing the importance of ideology
as the motivating factor in Soviet foreign policy include: Fred
Schwarz, You Can Trust the Communists (To Do What They Say)
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960); R.N. Carew
Hunt, "The Importance of Doctrine," Problems of Communism
,
March-April 1958; George Kennan(X), "The Sources of Soviet
Conduct," Foreign Affairs , July 1947, and Nathan Leites,
A Study of Bolshevism (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1953)
and The Operational Code of the Politburo (New York:
McGraw Hill, 1951)
.
See Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Totalitarian
Dictatorship and Autocracy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1956), and Merle Fainsod, How Russia is




, Russian national interests are basically un-
changed and Soviet foreign policy continues to pursue these
7
same basic goals.
These models served Soviet foreign policy analysts for
a number of years, but increasing dissatisfaction with their
inadequacies led to the development during the 1960's of a
number of more sophisticated approaches. Eric Hoffmann and
Frederic Fleron, in The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy
,
proposed a multi-factor, multi-level form of analysis which
g
considered inputs, process, and outputs. Vernon Aspaturian,
in his landmark book Process and Power in Soviet Foreign Policy
,
enlarged upon the concept of multiple variables interacting
to affect foreign policy output, and developed what he con-
sidered to be a "simple partial checklist" of variables
which includes well over one hundred items in the general
categories of motivations/purposes/intentions, capabilities/
9power, risks, cost/benefits, and opportunities.
At the same time that multifactor analyses were being
developed, the increasing openness of Soviet society after
7See R.S. Tarn, "Continuity in Russian Foreign Policy," in
Robert Goldwin, et al
.
, ed., Readings in Russian Foreign
Policy (Chicago: American Foundation for Political Education,
1959) ; and Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Ideology and National
Interest in Soviet Foreign Policy," in Process and Power in
Soviet Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971).
g
Erik Hoffmann and Frederic Fleron, The Conduct of Soviet
Foreign Policy (Chicago: Aldine, 1971), pp. 7-9.
Q
Vernon V. Aspaturian, Process and Power , pp. 67-81.
12

the death of Stalin enabled western scholars to begin appre-
ciating the role of domestic forces in Soviet foreign policy
formulation. Aspaturian's "Internal Politics and Foreign
Policy in the Soviet System," Sidney Ploss's "Studying the
Domestic Determinants of Soviet Foreign Policy/' and
Alexander Dallin's "Soviet Foreign Policy and Domestic
12Politics: A Framework for Analysis," are some examples.
At the same time as all of the above, increasing inter-
est was being shown in the field of decision-making theory
13
and analysis. The Cuban missile crisis then became a
catalyst, leading Graham Allison to publish what has become
a classic study in foreign policy analysis and behavior
14
modelling: "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis."
In this work Allison described three basic models for analyzing
Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Internal Politics and Foreign
Policy in the Soviet System," in R. Barry Farrell , ed.,
Approaches to Comparative and International Politics
(Evanston, 111. : Northwestern University Press, 1966).
Sidney Ploss, "Studying the Domestic Determinants of
Soviet Foreign Policy," Canadian Slavic Studies , Spring, 1967.
12
Alexander Dallin, "Soviet Foreign Policy and Domestic
Politics: A Framework for Analysis," Journal of International
Affairs
,
(Vol. XXIII, No. 2, 1969).
1 1
For example, see Joseph Frankel, The Making of Foreign
Policy: An Analysis of Decision-Making (London: Oxford
University Press, 1963).
Graham Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban
Missile Crisis," American Political Science Review ,
September, 1969, pp. 689-718.
13

foreign policy output: the rational process model, the
organizational process model, and the bureaucratic politics
model. In terms of the rational policy model, analysts
"attempt to understand happenings as the more or less purpos-
ive acts of unified national governments. For these analysts,
the point of an explanation is to show how the nation or
government could have chosen the action in question, given
the strategic problem that it faced." " The organizational
process model analyzes foreign policy acts and choices as
"outputs of large organizations functioning according to
1
6
certain regular patterns of behavior." The bureaucratic
politics model focuses on the internal politics of a govern-
ment, classifying foreign policy outputs as "outcomes of
various overlapping bargaining games among players arranged
hierarchically in the national government."
In recent years, the number of effective models for
analyzing Soviet foreign policy has been narrowed down to
two: the totalitarian-rational choice model and the organi-
1
8





17 T , .,Ibid .
1 o
In a later refinement of his three models, Allison com-
bined models 2 and 3 (organizational process and bureaucratic
politics). See Allison and Halpern, "Bureacratic Politics:
A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," Theory and Policy
in International Relations , edited by Richard Ullman and
Raymond Tanter (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972)
14

neither of these models can completely explain the continued
Soviet interest in peaceful coexistence over the past quarter
of a century. The decisions by the Soviet leaders to pursue
policies of peaceful coexistence were rational choices on
their part, given the alternatives of arms races, increasing
domestic discontent, and a return to the cold war, or worse.
We now know enough about the Soviet decisionmaking process
to realize that major foreign policy decisions are not made
solely by the General Secretary of the Communist Party, but
rather by majority vote or consensus among the members of
the Politburo. Thus, in Soviet politics, the Politburo
itself sometimes must be considered as the rational actor,
with the internal debate of the members likened to the mental
debate a single leader would engage in prior to any major
decision.
The bureaucratic politics approach may be the best
approach for analyzing a single decision or specific event,
19
such as Graham Allison's analysis of the Cuban missile crisis,
and Jiri Valenta's analysis of the Soviet decision to invade
20Czechoslovakia in 1968. However, when analyzing Soviet
interest in peaceful coexistence, a series of decisions which
evolved over a period of twenty-five years, the bureaucratic
politics model becomes an unwieldy, less than satisfactory
19Graham Allison, op. cit
.
, and, Essence of Decision:
Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown
and Co. , 1971)
.
20Jiri Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia,




approach: clearly defined decisions to follow a policy of
peaceful coexistence are hard to identify, and the data
necessary to document bureaucratic infighting, if existent,
is certainly unavailable in the West.
B. THE FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
For the purpose of this study, Soviet foreign policy
output is considered as a dependent variable, changing as
the result of changes in several independent variables, both
external and internal J Examples of the types of variables
affecting Soviet foreign policy output are: rivalry with
China, Soviet economic performance, the strategic balance,
European security concerns and Soviet bureaucratic politics^]
The Soviet foreign policy of peaceful coexistence has not
remained at a constant level, but rather, is a series of
spikes, rising above the level of other Soviet foreign policy
activity. If one were to graphically illustrate the magni-
tude of Soviet interest in peaceful coexistence over time,
it would appear like this:
c
u-i c id -u
"H -H iH
r-t 05 U
xi 03 > id >
-P +J JJ tJKD
03 en c c u




C .-i -H M(DH 01 U > C id
T3 rd -H U Q) T3 5
•h 2 u id £ (U H
fl O O JJ 0] -M
•H C C 5 x: en • <d H 03 03
> -H -H C 03 a J2 > 03 H
O. fd h id u 3 C Eh (U
e a n ^j in >-l 0) •H J T3 Cn
03 1 Q) 3 O x: N <c •H C





\£> V£> r» r*»
CTi cr> o\ a\
16

The peaks represent the obvious detente overtures of
1955, 1958-60, 1963 and 1970-72. The variations in the
magnitude of Soviet interest in peaceful coexistence is
caused by the changes in the number of variables operating
at any one time, and their importance as perceived by the
Soviet leaders.
The following variables have been identified as playing
a major role in Soviet interest in peaceful coexistence:
1955 : The turmoil and uncertainty caused by the death
of Stalin, the Soviet desire to resolve the German question,
concerns about improving the Soviet "image" abroad, the
lopsided strategic balance, relations with China, Soviet
economic problems, and Soviet desire for a recognition of
the status quo in Eastern Europe.
1958-60 ; Khruschev's need for a foreign policy success
after the unsuccessful coup against him in June, 1957, Euro-
pean security, the growing Sino-Soviet split, the development
of strategic weapons by the Soviet Union, and Soviet economic
problems
.
1963 : The Cuban debacle and the need for increased
Soviet defense spending, Soviet economic problems, the Sino-
Soviet dispute, the proposed German inclusion in the NATO
multilateral force, and Khrushchev's need to reinforce his
leadership position after the Cuban missile crisis.
1970-72: Soviet economic problems, the achievement of
strategic parity, Soviet perceptions of U.S. domestic
17

problems, Soviet perceptions of the effects of detente
on Western Europe, Soviet apprehensions of China, the
possibility of future Eastern European unrest after the
Czechoslovakian uprising, and the fear of nuclear war.
This analysis views the pursuit of a policy of peaceful
coexistence as a purposive act of the Soviet leaders given
their perceptions of the problems facing them in each of
these periods. Sometimes the Soviet leaders acted in con-
cert, and sometimes there was a divergence of views. The
"given" in each situation was the foreign policy output:
a policy of peaceful coexistence. This study analyzes the
variables which brought about this policy.
All states, to some degree, act on the basis of national
interests, and the ultimate national interest is survival.
The Soviet Union (Russia) has been threatened and invaded
so many times that the Russians have developed a "neurotic
view of world affairs" based on a "traditional and instinc-
21tive Russian sense of insecurity." Indeed, by one author's
count, the Soviet Union has been invaded over 160 times, and
22
has participated in 17 wars since the founding of the U.S.
This resultant concern for security was evident during all
four periods of heightened Soviet interest in peaceful
21George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston: Atlantic
Little, Brown and Co., 1967), pp. 549-560.
22Morton Schwartz, The Foreign Policy of the U.S.S.R.:
Domestic Factors (Encino, Ca. : Dickenson, 1975), p. 75.
18

coexistence. The Soviet leaders perceived certain threats
(internal as well as external) to their national security,
and they then sought to minimize these threats through a
foreign policy of peaceful coexistence. Throughout this
study peaceful coexistence will be analyzed as a tactic of
the Soviet Union to ensure her continued existence and
growth in a hostile world.
19

II. PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND DETENTE
Peace and peaceful coexistence are not one and the
same thing. Peaceful coexistence does not mean a
temporary and unstable armistice between two wars,
but something more complex. 23
While the terms "peaceful coexistence" and "detente" are
often used interchangeably in the West, the subtle differ-
ences between the Soviet and western interpretations of
these two terms are frequently overlooked. In addition,
there is a history of meanings associated with the term
"peaceful coexistence," such that Stalin's use of the term
does not carry the same implications as when used by Khrushchev
These nuances are extremely important and must be completely
understood before starting an analysis of their implementa-
tion in Soviet foreign policy.
A. LENIN ON PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE
Peaceful coexistence is the literal translation of the
Russian words mirnoe sosuchestvovanie , and although there
are numerous references in Soviet literature to the "Leninist
policy of peaceful coexistence," these references are nothing
more than ex post facto creations of Soviet ideologists. For
Lenin never advocated a policy of peaceful coexistence. He
23
H. Dona, Peaceful Coexistence: A Basic Principle of
the Foreign Policy of the Rumanian Peoples Republic (Bucharest:
State Publishing House, 1963)
,
p~! 2~. Cited in Richard Allen,
"Peace or Peaceful Coexistence?" Detente: Cold War Strategies
In Transition
, edited by Eleanor Dulles and Robert Crane.
(New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 29.
20

analyzed the world situation and saw that the infant social-
ist state was unable to spread revolution because of its
terribly weakened condition. This necessitated a short
period of consolidation and rebuilding on the part of the
Bolsheviks prior to spreading revolution by means of the
Red Army.
There can be no doubt that our army is absolutely
in no condition at the present moment... to resist a
German offensive. Further, there is not the slight-
est doubt that the peasant majority of our army would
at the present juncture unreservedly declare in favor
of an annexationist peace, and not of an immediate
revolutionary war; for the Socialist reorganization
of the army... has just begun. 2 4
References by Lenin to peaceful coexistence can only be
found on five separate occasions in his extensive collection
of writings and speeches, and none are more than passing
comments of insignificant importance describing existing con-
ditions and the need for a period of consolidation of revo-
lutionary gains. In addition, not even once did Lenin use
the official Khrushchev formulation of peaceful coexistence
mirnoe sosuschestvovanie , but rather, peaceful cohabitation
25
mirnoe sozhitel * stvo . For Lenin believed that:
V.I. Lenin, "Theses on the Question of a Separate Peace
with Germany," January 20, 1918. Robert Goldwin, ed.
,
Readings in Russian Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1959), p. 109.
25V.I. Lenin, Collected Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers,
4th ed., 45 vols., 1960-70), XXX, p. 365; XXXII, p. 317;
XXXIII, pp. 385-387; XLII, pp. 195-196; Christian Science
Monitor , Dec. 17, 1919, p. 1. Paul Marantz, "Peaceful Co-
existence: From Heresy to Orthodoxy." Paul Cocks, et al .
,
ed., The Dynamics of Soviet Politics (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1976), p. 294.
21

...the existence of the Soviet Republic beside the
imperialist states during a lengthy period of time
is inconceivable. In the very end either one or
the other must win. And before this result, a
series of most horrible conflicts between the
Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states is
unavoidable. 26
Throughout the years of the Russian revolution and into
the early 1920' s, Lenin and his closest followers waited
patiently for the proletariat of Western Europe to revolt, for
they knew that Russia was industrially backwards and could
not achieve the creation of a socialist society until joined
by the more advanced states. Unsure of the reliability of
the Soviet armed forces, the Bolsheviks encouraged revolution
in Europe via propaganda and the control of local communist
parties by the Comintern. Simultaneously, they began con-
struction at home of the base needed for the spreading of
revolution by means of the Red Army. During this period
coexistence was not a choice, but a forced necessity.
B. STALIN AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AS A TACTIC
Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, et al. were revolutionaries, and
they shared a vision of the victorious proletariat of Russia
uniting with the dissatisfied and exploited workers of the
capitalist West to create the new socialist world order.
However, at the time of Lenin's death in January, 1924, the
world revolution seemed no closer than it had six years
V.I. Lenin, Collected Works , XXIX, p. 133. Cited in
Wladyslaw Kulski, Peaceful Coexistence: An Analysis of
Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago: Regnery Co., 1959), p. 131
22

earlier when the Bolsheviks initially seized power in Russia.
Cognizant of Russia's weakened economic condition and reluc-
tant to try to spread Marxism-Leninism by means of a Red
Army of dubious reliability, Stalin, in the Fall of 1924,
began proclaiming what was later to become the doctrine of
"socialism in one country," that is, a socialist Russia,
temporarily coexisting with capitalist neighbors, building
socialism inside her own borders while waiting for the revo-
lutionary consciousness of the western workers to develop.
This doctrine was based on Stalin's "extreme skepticism
about world revolution and confidence in the reality of a
27long truce between Russian and the capitalist world."
Indeed, Stalin became so skeptical of prospects for world
revolution that he stated, in a speech at Sverdlov Univer-
sity in June, 1925, that the "victory of Socialism in the
28leading capitalist states might be delayed for 10-20 years."
The first documented use of the term "peaceful coexist-
ence" by Stalin occurred at the Fourteenth Party Congress
in 1925, when he acknowledged the fact of peaceful coexistence
and its forced nature as the current state of international
affairs
:
27 Isaac Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 391.
28
J.V. Stalin, Sochinenia (Collected Works) (Moscow:
State Publishing House, 1947), Vol. 7, p. 166.
23

The fundamental and new, the decisive feature, which
has affected all the events in the sphere of foreign
relations during this period, is the fact that a
certain temporary equilibrium of forces has been estab-
lished between our country and the countries of the
capitalistic world; an equilibrium which has determined
the present period of "peaceful coexistence." 29
Soviet Russia was still in no condition to spread revolution
by force, and the West, after a long and bitter world war,
did not have the motivation or foresight to take action
against the Soviet Union. Thus, the state of affairs re-
ferred to by Stalin as peaceful coexistence emerged more by
weakness and default than by any Soviet grand design.
Soviet writers are always careful to distinguish between
strategy and tactics, and peaceful coexistence was initially
conceived of as a tactic, a device with which the young Soviet
state could buy time until she was strong enough to vigor-
ously export revolutions abroad. As explained by Stalin in
1924,
Stategy deals with the main forces of the revolution
and their reserves. It changes with the passing of the
revolution from one stage to another, but remains
essentially unchanged throughout a given stage.
While the object of strategy is to win the war...
tactics pursues less important objectives, for the
object of tactics is not the winning of the war as a
whole, but the winning of some particular engagements
or some particular battles. ^0
29
J.V. Stalin, Political Report of the Central Committee
to the Fourteenth Congress of the CPSU (Moscow, 1950), p. 3.
Cited in Vernon V. Aspaturian, Process and Power
, p. 340.
30J.V. Stalin, "The Foundations of Leninism," in Problems





Peaceful coexistence was Stalin's tactic for ensuring the
survival of the Soviet Union in a hostile international
environment. As described by Stalin at the Fifteenth Party
Congress in 1927,
..our task is to pay attention to contradictions in
the capitalist camp, to delay war by "buying off" the
capitalists and to take all measures to maintain peace-
ful relations .. .Our relations with the capitalist
countries are based on the assumption that the co-
existence of the two opposing systems is possible.
[emphasis added]
Called the "peace policy" in the 1920 's, the need for
coexistence was rooted in Stalin's view of the world and
his perception of the prospects for a long delay until the
world revolution. The transitory and self-serving nature of
Stalin's interest in peaceful coexistence becomes extremely
evident when a search of his writings and speeches reveals
only three references to peaceful coexistence during the
twenty-five year period between 1928 and 1953, and the fact
that peaceful coexistence was not once mentioned at the
32
party congresses held in 1930, 1934, 1939, and 1952. In
addition, peaceful coexistence was not even defined in the
Soviet Diplomatic Dictionary published in 1951.
Thus we have Lenin referring to coexistence as a descrip-
tive state of affairs. Stalin, going one step further, promoted
31J.V. Stalin, Political Report of the Central Committee
to the Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU (Moscow: Foreign
Languages Publishing House, 1950) , pp. 26-27.




peaceful coexistence as a temporary tactic in order to
strengthen socialist gains in Soviet Russia prior to the
forceable export of revolution. Now we move on to Khrushchev
who fundamentally changed the policy of peaceful coexist-
ence into what we know it as today.
C. KHRUSHCHEV AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AS A STRATEGY
The Stalinist era was one of forced and uneasy coexist-
ence, particularly after the Second World War when the anti-
western, xenophobic influence of Zhadanov reached its peak.
The occupation of Eastern Europe, the Berlin blockade of 1948,
and the Korean War of 1950-1953 all contributed to a growing
hostility between West and East. Stalin died on March 5,
1953, and soon thereafter his successors demonstrated a more
peaceful line towards the West. On March 15, ten days after
Stalin's passing, Malenkov, who then headed the Soviet govern-
ment, proclaimed to the Supreme Soviet: "At the present time
there is no disputed or unresolved question that cannot be
settled peacefully by mutual agreement of the interested
countries. This applies to our relations with all states,
33
including the United States of America."
Between Stalin's death in 1953 and Khrushchev's emergence
as the leading figure at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956,
there was a painful period of reappraisal of the events of
33Pravda, March 16, 1953
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the Stalin era, and a careful reevaluation of the global
power position of the Soviet Union. The development of
nuclear weapons technology in the U.S.S.R., culminating in
their first thermonuclear blast in 1954, and the prospects
for an early marriage of rocket technology and nuclear weapons,
led Khrushchev to a very optimistic evaluation of the world
situation. Soviet thinkers determined that the balance (or
correlation) of forces in the world was shifting in favor of
the socialist camp, and that due to the increasing might of
the socialist camp and the decrease in the power of the
capitalist camp, that war was no longer inevitable, as
taught by Lenin. This change in Communist doctrine then -^r
enabled Khrushchev to declare:
The simultaneous existence of two opposite world
systems, the capitalist and the socialist, developing
according to different laws and in opposite directions,
has become an indisputable fact... the Leninist principle
of peaceful coexistence of states with different social
systems has always been and remains the general line of
our country's foreign policy... And this is natural, for
there is no other way in present day conditions.
Indeed, there are only two ways: either peaceful co-
existence or the most destructive war in history.
There is no third way. 34
The awesome prospect of nuclear warfare and a cautious
optimism concerning trends in the development of advanced
weapons systems combined to cause a change in the Leninist
doctrine on the inevitability of war, and while one Leninist
doctrine was being repudiated, a new one was being created.
N.S. Khrushchev, "Speech to the Twentieth Party Congress"
Pravda, February 15, 1956.
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Henceforth Soviet writings were to be full of references to
the "Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of states
with different social system.
"
As with most communist doctrines, the meaning of a new
policy becomes much clearer with successive interpretations
and explanations. Shepilov, then Minister of Foreign Affairs,
explained away the apparent contradiction between a policy Jfc
of peaceful coexistence and the support of national libera-
tion movements in the Third World this way:
Peaceful coexistence is not a conflictless life.
As long as different social-political systems continue
to exist, the antagonisms between them are unavoidable.
Peaceful coexistence is a struggle, political, economic
and ideological .. .coexistence means that one does not
fight the other, does not attempt to solve inter-
national disputes by arms, but that one competes
through peaceful work and economic and cultural activi-
ties. But we would cease to be Marxist-Leninists if we
forgot the elementary laws of social life, the laws of
class struggle. 35
One of the clearest and perhaps the most forceful dec-
laration on the policy of peaceful coexistence can be found
in the Statement of the 81 Communist and Workers Parties of
December 1960:
The policy of peaceful coexistence is a policy of
mobilizing the masses and launching vigorous action
against the enemies of peace. Peaceful coexistence
of states does not imply renunciation of the class
struggle. . .The coexistence of states with different
social systems is a form of class struggle between
socialism and capitalism. In conditions of peaceful
coexistence favorable opportunities are provided for
Pravda, February 13, 1957. Cited in Wladyslaw Kulski,
Peaceful Coexistence: An Analysis of Soviet Foreign Policy
(Chicago: Regnery Co., 1959), p. 133.
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the development of the class struggle in the capital-
ist countries and the national liberation movement of
the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries.
In their turn the successes of the revolutionary class
and national-liberation struggle promote peaceful
coexistence. The Communists consider it their duty
to fortify the faith of the people in the possibility
of furthering peaceful coexistence, their determination
to prevent world war. They will do their utmost for
the people to weaken imperialism and limit its sphere
of action by the active struggle for peace, democracy,
and national liberation. 36
While Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence was
heralded by western observers as a welcomed break in the
tensions of the cold war era, there was great opposition
within the Communist world to the literal meaning of this
new policy. As a result, the theoretical journal Kommunist
published an editorial in 1962 telling party members exactly
what peaceful coexistence was not :
First, peaceful coexistence does not weaken, but
contributes to an intensification of the class struggle
of the proletariet; second, peaceful coexistence does
not weaken but strengthens the position of fighters for
national independence; third, peaceful coexistence does
not mean refusal to fight imperialism—on the contrary,
it champions and permits an intensification of the
ideological, political and economic struggle against
imperialism; fourth, under conditions of peaceful
coexistence, there are real possibiliities for the
development of socialist revolution and all forms of
revolutionary movement. 3 7
This explanation of peaceful coexistence makes even
more sense when placed in the perspective of Khruschchev and
3 6 Statement of the 31 Communist and Workers Parties Meeting
in Moscow , USSR, December 1960, p. 16. Cited in Eleanor
Dulles, Detente: Cold War Strategies in Transition , p. 28.
37Kommunist, No. 5, 1962, p. 121.
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the emphasis that he placed on the intensification of the
struggle in the Third World. Peaceful coexistence would be
the official policy towards the West, but the former colonial
and Third World areas were to be fair game for revolution-
izing. Thus, Khrushchev could speak of peaceful coexistence
and revolutionary movements in the same breath.
Initially, peaceful coexistence was an expression of the
need of the new Soviet state to obtain time to recover from
the strains of World War I and the civil war. Then Stalin
used a policy of peaceful coexistence as a tactical maneuver
in order to gain time to strengthen and fortify the Soviet
Union before its inevitable clash with the capitalists.
Khrushchev and his ideologists finally determined that due
to the changing correlation of world forces war was no
longer fatally inevitable, and peaceful coexistence became
a long term strategy.
The Marxist-Leninists do not understand the policy
of peaceful coexistence as a tactical maneuver de-
signed for some limited span of time, but as a
strategic line designed for the whole period of the
transition from capitalism to socialism on a world
scale. 38
D. BREZHNEV AND DETENTE
Khrushchev, the architect of the Soviet policy of peace-
ful coexistence, was deposed in October, 1964, and almost
"For the Unity and Solidarity of the International
Communist Movement," Pravda , December 6, 1963. Cited in
Richard Allen, Peace or Peaceful Coexistence (Chicago:




immediately the Soviet Union began to follow a harder line
towards the West. In Brezhnev's speech on foreign policy
at the Twenty-third Party Congress in 1966, the section on
peaceful coexistence sounded much more hostile than in the
past:
At the same time that we expose the aggressive policy
of imperialism we consistently and unswervingly pursue
a policy of peaceful coexistence .. .while. .. the Soviet
Union. . .consistently advocates normal, peaceful re-
lations with capitalist countries and a settlement of
controversial issues between states by negotiation and
not by war .. .Naturally there can be no peaceful
coexistence when it comes to internal processes of the
class and national-liberation struggle in the capital-
ist countries between oppressors and the oppressed,
between colonialists and the victims of colonial
oppression. 39
Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence envisioned
the Soviet Union and the United States as co-rulers of the
world: "We believe that countries with differing social
systems can more than exist side by side. It is necessary
to proceed further to improve relations, strengthen confi-
dence between countries, and cooperate."'1 On many occas-
ions Khrushchev stressed that "history has imposed upon our
two peoples a great responsibility for the destiny of the
world," and that in regards to Soviet-American relations,
L.I. Brezhnev, "Address to the Twenty-third Congress of
the CPSU," cited in Marshall Shulman, "Recent Soviet
Foreign Policy: Some Patterns in Retrospect," Vernon
Aspaturian, ed., Process and Power , p. 812.
40N.S. Khrushchev, Report of the Central Committee of the
Soviet Union to the Twentieth Party Congress (Moscow:
Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1950), pp. 40-41.
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"our interests do not clash directly anywhere, either
territorially or economically." -1 Khrushchev, seeing the
relative improvement of the strategic power of the Soviet
Union vis-a-vis the United States, was apparently satisfied
with the prospect of being the junior partner in a two
power world. His successors, however, were not.
Communists, in general, are very precise in the termin-
ology they use. This being the case, it is interesting to
note the decrease in the use of the term mirnoe sosuschest -
vovanie (peaceful coexistence) by the Brezhnev-Kosygin
leadership, and the increasing frequency of the use of the
term razryadka (loosely, detente) . Razryadka , although
frequently translated to mean detente, is a weapons-
oriented term which means to unload a weapon, much the same
as the French term "detente" originally meant the reduction
of the tension on a crossbow string as a gesture of good
faith. While Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence
described a long-term strategy, containing elements of con-
frontation and cooperation, the Brezhnev-Kosygin line stresses
only a lessening of tensions within the general framework of
peaceful coexistence. The competition implied in the Soviet
formulation of peaceful coexistence still exists, but the
Pravda , December 31, 1961, in an address to the Supreme
Soviet"
For a further development of the condominium/dyarchy
theme, see Vernon Aspaturian, "Soviet Foreign Policy
Perspectives in the Sixties," in Process and Power .
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Soviet leaders are trying to reduce the potential for con-
flict, and hence, they stress detente. According to Brezhnev,
the current period of detente (1975) renounces "the form and
methods [of the Cold War era] and not the ideological
struggle. . .During the transition from cold war toward detente
and the development of cooperation between East and West,
the ideological struggle, far from subsiding, has gained in
scope. . .Detente in no way annuls the battle of ideas." 43
While this formulation sounds very similar to Khrushchev's
pronouncements on peaceful coexistence, the change in
terminology implies a deeper commitment on the part of the
current leadership to the policy of coexistence and detente.
The inclusion of peaceful coexistence in the new "Brezhnev"
Constitution of the U.S.S.R. (1977, Article 28) as a goal
of Soviet foreign policy is significant in this respect
because it reflects the goals of the current leadership for
the present and near term future.
The pronouncements of Stalin and Khrushchev on peaceful
coexistence sounded superficially similar, but Stalin was
speaking of a tactic and Khrushchev of a strategy. Brezhnev's
explanation of detente sounds similar to Khrushchev's policy
of peaceful coexistence, but again there are subtle differ-
ences. The current Soviet leadership has not engaged in
43
L.I. Brezhnev, Pravda, October 15, 1975. Cited in
Y. Zakharov, "International Cooperation and the Battle
of Ideas," International Affairs (1-1976), p. 88.
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the brinksmanship of the Khrushchev era, nor has it been
satisfied with the strategic inferiority which caused some
of Khrushchev's gambles. The Soviet leaders now prefer to
talk of razryadka , or a relaxation of tensions, while con-
tinuing to increase the military strength of the Soviet
Union. Peaceful coexistence and detente will no longer
be forced necessities for the Soviet Union, but rather a
policy chosen from a position of strength.
34

III. THE GENEVA THAW
The Russians went to Geneva saying that what they
wanted was a "relaxation of tensions." During a
single momentous week there, although no agreement
was reached on any of the vital issues at stake,
the impression was conveyed to the world that the
cold war was over and that a new era of peace was
at hand. .
.
Tensions relaxed immediately all over the world,
and along with them, efforts to build strength and
unity against the Communist threat, which is what
the Russians were after. ^4
After a quarter of a century in power, Stalin died on
March 5, 1953. An era had ended. Without a clearly
defined path of succession, Stalin's former assistants were
now thrust into positions for which they had no prior train-
ing. As a result, Malenkov as Chairman of the Council of
Ministers, Molotov as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Beria
as the Minister of Internal Affairs began formulating
foreign and domestic policies in a cautious, conservative
manner
.
The first hints of a Soviet desire to relax tensions in
East-West relations were contained in the speeches given at
Stalin's funeral. Malenkov stressed the need to settle
45
disputed or unresolved questions peacefully. Beria stressed
that the principle task then facing the Soviet Union was
44Averell Harriman, "The Soviet Challenge and American




to prevent both the preparation and the unleashing of world
war, and Molotov assured his audience that the Soviet Union
46harbored no aggressive aims. These refreshing references
to peace were well received in the West, and on April 20,
1953, Churchill, in a speech to the House of Commons, pro-
posed a summit conference to attempt to feel out the minor
indications of change that were evident in the acts and
proclamations of the new Soviet leadership. While differ-
ences between Washington and London on the format of the
conference were being discussed, the Soviet Union came out
in favor of the conference, provided that "the parties come
47
to it without any fixed preliminary demands." (The U.S.
had wanted a preliminary meeting between the Americans,
British, and French to form a common front.) This initial
proposal led to a Foreign Ministers' conference in 1954, and
finally to the Geneva Summit in 1955.
Soviet foreign policy actions supporting a relaxation
in international tensions were enumerated by Premier Bulganin
in his opening speech at Geneva: "the termination of the
bloodshed in Korea and also the cessation of hostilities in
Indochina," "the concluding of the state treaty with Austria,
the normalization of relations between the U.S.S.R. and
J
46Albert Weeks, The Troubled Detente (New York: Union
Press, 1976)
, pp. 86-87.
47Pravda , May 24, 1953. Cited in David Dallin, Soviet





Yugoslavia. . .the success of the conference of... Asian and
African countries in Bandung, the visit to the Soviet Union
of Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru. .. [and] the proposal made by the
Federal Republic of Germany to establish diplomatic, commer-
48
cial and cultural relations between the U.S.S.R. and F.R.G."
In July, 1955, after the preliminary attempts by the
Soviet leaders to change their public image as noted above,
the heads of state of the United States, the Soviet Union,
France and England met in Geneva, Switzerland for very
cordial and highly publicized talks about international
relations, disarmament, European security, and the German
problem. Although few concrete results emerged from this
meeting, it visibly contributed to a lessening of inter-
national tension. The press aptly dubbed this lessening of
tensions and increased East-West dialogue "the spirit of
Geneva.
"
What motivated the Soviet leaders to shift to this new,
more peaceful policy? Were they being influenced by the
so-called "peaceful forces" in the West, were they buying
time to develop a nuclear arsenal, or were there different
reasons? The following factors are considered the most
significant elements.
A. THE DEATH OF STALIN
Due to the lack of established lines of succession in
the Soviet government, the death of Stalin threw his
N. Bulganin, "Relaxation of International Tension"
Speech delivered at the Geneva Conference, July 18, 1955
Vital Speeches , vol. 21, August 1, 1955, p. 1384.

immediate subordinates into a turmoil. Stalin was only the
second Soviet leader to pass away. in addition to the
lack of formal machinery to handle succession, Stalin had
held the post of General Secretary of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union for over a quarter of a century,
periodically purging the top party leadership of those men
by whom he felt threatened. There was no one person with
the charisma and base of support who could fill the void
left by Stalin's passing, nor was there anyone who felt
sure enough of his own position in the ruling hierarchy to
try to immediately assume Stalin's mantle. The three
strongest competitors for the top position at that time
were Malenkov, Molotov, and Beria. Malenkov was the pre-
sumed heir apparent because of his position as Stalin's most
trusted aide, and head of Stalin's private secretariat. As
of yet, Khrushchev was not one of the major actors, and he
was given the less visible post of head of the Secretariat
of the Central Committee.
Due to Stalin's passing and their own lack of experience
in decisionmaking and exercising power, the new Soviet
leaders felt threatened. They were afraid that the cap-
italist enemies of the Soviet Union might exploit the tem-
porary weakness in the Soviet leadership in order to retake
Eastern Europe or possible something worse. In addition
to fearing internal dissent and intraparty problems, they
were also afraid of each other.
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The early twentieth century witnessed the blooming of
anarchistic tendencies among the Russians. In January, 1905,
there was a mass demonstration outside the Tsar's Winter
Palace, protesting the domestic depravations caused by the
Russo-Japanese War. The repression of this demonstration
led to bloodshed
, and "bloody Sunday" became the first of
a series of antigovernment demonstrations during 1905-1906.
The hardships of the First World War led to a resurgence of
anti-government agitation, and the overthrow of the tsarist
regime in February, 1917. The Provisional government con-
tinued to support the war effort, and it, too, was over-
thrown in October of that year. Dissatisfaction with the
inability of the Bolsheviks to solve the nation's problems
then led to the Kronstadt uprising in 19 21. After Stalin's
death, the collective leadership was afraid "First, of the
people, then of each other. To them it was not inconceiv-
able that free of Stalin, the Russian people would remember
their revolutionary tradition. . .Constant repetition of the
theme of unity and firmness incongruously combined with a
49plea for 'prevention of any kind of disorder and panic.'"
In order to concentrate their attention on domestic matters,
the Soviet leaders needed to divest themselves of external
problems. It is not coincidental that the Korean armistice
was signed in July, 1953, only four months after Stalin's
death.





On the intraparty level, the Soviet leaders were just as
concerned about uprisings in the satellites as they were
about uprisings in the Soviet Union. The "little Stalins"
of Eastern Europe (Ulbricht in E. Germany, Rakosi in Hungary)
had lost their prime supporter in the Kremlin. In June,
1953, uprisings occurred in East Berlin, various other towns
of East Germany, and in Pilsen, Czechoslovakia. While these
demonstrations and strikes were initially prompted by local
economic gripes, they developed from simple protests into
anti-Soviet and anti-Communist rallys. This gave the Soviet
leaders a feeling of uncertainty concerning their ability
to control the populations of the satellites and the Soviet
population as well. This, coupled with the "containment"
and "rollback" doctrines being espoused by the new Eisenhower
administration in the U.S., contributed to the perception of
the Soviet leaders that they were threatened, and became a
factor in determining the new, more conciliatory course
towards the West
.
B. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE STRATEGIC BALANCE
Rushing to occupy Germany in the final weeks of World
War II, the Soviets gained access to a large part of the
available German rocket technology, the further development
of which became a high priority item in the Soviet Union.
Although the United States held an atomic monopoly in the
immediate post-war era, the Soviet Union was not far behind,
exploding their first atomic bomb in 194 9, and their first
40

thermonuclear bomb in 1953. The Soviet leaders apparently
foresaw the tremendous potential of long-range rockets with
thermonuclear warheads, and simply needed time to bring
about the union of these two relatively new technologies.
The spectacular Soviet missile achievements of 1957,
including the first successful launching of a multistage
ICBM in August, the Sputnik I launching in October, the
Sputnik 2 launching with an 1100 lb. payload in November,
and the appearance of a MRBM in Red Square on November 7
,
all had to have had their research and development work done
in the mid-1950 period. Thus, Soviet behavior during this
period was aimed at securing a "breathing space" during which
the Soviets would be free to develop their own position of
strength. In so doing, and by adding rockets to their
arsenal, the Soviets might be able to stand up to the West
at a later time. First, however, it was necessary to "walk
softly while fashioning a big stick."
While definite, strong internal forces were compelling
the Soviet leaders to establish an era of lessened tension,
the Soviets were also looking for a period of detente as a
counter to U.S. arms programs. During the Korean War the
U.S. carried out a large expansion of the Strategic Air
Command (SAC), giving the U.S. the power to attack the
U.S.S.R. with a bomber fleet of about 4 00 aircraft which
50
Albert Weeks, The Other Side of Coexistence (New York
Pitman Publishing Co., 1970), p. 166.
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were capable of two-way attack missions, and a total number
of U.S. bombers capable of executing an atomic strike on
the Soviet Union in the vicinity of 1350. The correspond-
ing figures for the Soviet Union were about 4 and 350,
51
respectively. This period also saw the deployment of
nuclear armed carrier task forces to the Mediterranean,
directly threatening the Soviet Union. Additionally, by
195 5 the advanced B-52 manned bomber had completed the
development cycle and had been placed in series production.
Thus it was in the best interests of the Soviet Union to
put on a peaceful face and try to influence opinions in the
West in order to effect a slowing of the American arms
buildup, and perhaps even a cutback in Western defense
expenditures. This Soviet concern for security was clearly
evident in a speech given by Molotov at the tenth anniver-
sary meeting of the United Nations in June, 1955:
Some countries have of late become the scene of an
unprecedented armaments race that lays on the masses
of the people an enormous burden of military expendi-
ture. Also in progress is the constant stockpiling
of atomic and hydrogen weapons
.
Large scale construction of military bases is going
on in foreign territories. That these bases are being
built up for purposes having nothing to do with defense
can be deduced from the mere fact that they are to be
found thousands of miles away from the countries con-
structing them.
New military blocs and alliances are constantly being
formed in Europe, in Asia and in other parts of the
world. Things have reached such a pass that agreements
have been concluded to remilitarize Western Germany and
Zbigniew Brzezinski, "How the Cold War Was Played,"
Foreign Affairs , October 1972, p. 188.
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integrate her into military groupings the aggressive
character of which is well known. 52
C. EUROPEAN SECURITY
In June, 1955, U.S. Secretary of State Dulles met with
Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Molotov in San Francisco
to discuss the upcoming Geneva summit. When asked by Dulles
what problems the Soviet government most wanted to discuss,
Molotov replied: disarmament, European security, and economic
53
cooperation. What threats did the Soviet Union perceive
in the current European status quo, and what were their
solutions?
During the immediate post-war years, and extending into
the 1950 's, the question of German reunification was a major
point of contention in East-West relations, and also caused
disagreement among the Soviet leaders themselves. Stalin's
last position on German reunification was put forth in a note
on March 10, 1952, in response to the imminent establishment
of the European Defense Community with West Germany a member.
Stalin reiterated his demand for the speedy signing of a
German peace treaty which would safeguard "the legitimate
national interests of the German people." An "all-German
government" was to be established, and the united Germany
52Vyacheslav Molotov, Establish Trust Among Nations ,
"Pass From Words to Deeds," Speech delivered at the tenth
anniversary meeting of the U.N., June 22, 1955. Vital
Speeches , July 15, 1955, pp. 1346-1347.
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was to have a limited armed forces establishment, and be
prohibited from joining any alliance against any member of
the former anti-Hitler coalition.
The conditions attached to German reunification precluded
Western agreement, and nothing happened. However, shortly
after the death of Stalin, the Soviet government agreed to
a four power conference on the German question to be held
in Berlin in January, 1954. (This was to be the first meeting
of the foreign ministers of the three Western powers and
the Soviet Union in five years.) Meanwhile, a power struggle
was going on in the Kremlin which involved the status of
East Germany.
As noted before, immediately after Stalin's death Beria
obtained control of the combined Ministry of Internal Affairs
and the Ministry of State Security. He was ambitious, ruth-
less, and clearly a threat to his colleagues. One of Beria'
s
maneuvers to enhance his popularity among the masses was
through liberalizations which would be noticed by the public
and gain him the reputation of being somewhat liberal. Thus,
he curbed the powers of the secret police, released prisoners
of the Stalin era, and advocated a general political relaxa-
tion. Along these lines, Beria supported a "new course" for
East Germany which was a repudiation of Ulbricht's Stalinist
policies. The "new course" envisioned greater emphasis on
54Victor Baras, "Stalin's German Policy After Stalin,"
Slavic Review, June, 1978, pp. 260-261.
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the production of consumer goods, a relaxation of the politi-
cal pressure on the population, and demanded self-criticism
and reform from the party hierarchy in the G.D.R. This pro-
gram contained no references whatsoever to building socialism
in East Germany.
After Beria's arrent in June, 1953, he was accused of
high treason and executed. Later it was claimed by Khrushchev
that Beria had been advocating faulty policies with regard
to Germany.
Very few facts are known, but it may be postulated that
Beria was planning to pursue an attempt at German reunifica-
tion for his own political purposes. If he could liberalize
the incumbent regime enough to satisfy the East Germans, he
might be able to risk free elections in an attempt to foster
East-West detente and to bolster his own position. The
literature on this development is full of innuendo, and short
« *. 56on fact.
Regardless of what Beria had planned, the June, 1953
uprisings in East Germany demonstrated widespread popular
dissatisfaction with Communism and Soviet domination, and
probably forever destroyed the possibility of free elections
for German unification. It became extremely obvious to the
o5Victor Baras, "Beria's Fall and Ulbricht's Survival,"
Soviet Studies , July, 1975, p. 393 and notes 38 and 39.
For example, in Michel Tatu's Power in the Kremlin (New
York: Viking Press, 1969) there is a note which states "Beria
and Malenkov had allegedly been tempted to sell out East
Germany after Stalin's death." (p. 314) The sellout to whom,
how, and why are left unanswered.
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Soviet leaders how the vote would go, and controlling half
of Germany was probably better, in Soviet eyes, than
controlling none at all.
All illusion of free elections having been destroyed,
the objective of Soviet German policy became "not the unifi-
cation of Germany, but the prevention of West Germany's entry
57into the Western alliance. Each and every time West
Germany was about to move closer to the West via the Euro-
pean Defense Community proposal or the NATO agreements, the
Soviets would try to entice them into delaying their decision
by means of a renewed offer for reunification. Frustrated
at Soviet intransigence and the lack of progress at the
January-February 19 54 Foreign Ministers' Conference, the
NATO allies agreed upon West German rearmament as a part of
the NATO strategy. Traditional Russian animosity for the
Germans and the threat the Soviets perceived from a rearmed
West Germany led Premier Bulganin to state at the Geneva Con-
ference that the rearming of West Germany and her entry into
NATO "would make pointless any discussion on the unification
of Germany.
"
Another reason for Soviet displeasure over West Germany's
joining NATO was that it limited future options for the
Soviets to exercise pressure on Germany. Had the Russians
57Victor Baras, "Stalin's German Policy after Stalin,"
p. 262
.
58Vital Speeches, August 15, 1955, p. 1412.
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been able to keep Germany out of NATO and relatively neu-
tral, subversion might have been a successful means to
extend Soviet influence over the whole Germany. However,
the Soviets correctly saw that once West Germany was a NATO
member, the costs and risks of an attempt to subvert her
were exceedingly high.
The Soviets may have been willing to give a little more
on the issue of Germany, but their asking price was a dras-
tic reduction of U.S. influence and military power in Europe.
The Soviets wanted a non-aggression pact to be signed between
NATO and the Warsaw Pact, followed by the development of
an all-European security system and the abolition of defen-
sive alliances. This was envisioned to involve the removal
of U.S. strategic bombers from the European theater (forward
based systems) and a general pullback by both the Soviet Union
and the United States. However, since the Soviet Union her-
self was a European power, she would be represented in this
European security arrangement and the U.S. would not. The
effects of this proposal would have been a severe relative
power imbalance in Europe, heavily weighted towards the
Soviet Union due to her geographical proximity and the limited
ability of the U.S. to threaten nuclear retaliation without
forward basing areas. (Recall that this is the era before
ICBM's.
)
Having been invaded twice in less than 50 years from
Western Europe, the Soviet Union wanted to do all it could
to erect a secure barrier between herself and the West.
47

Soviet references to European security and a solution to
the German problem during this era were attempts to mini-
mize the possibility of future threats to Soviet security
from the western flank.
D. IMPROVING THE SOVIET "IMAGE"
Stalin and the recollections of "Stalinist Russia" gave
the Soviet Union a bad image. His iron rule, the excesses
committed under his direction, and his use of terror made
the Soviet Union feared, and also looked upon as somewhat
backwards. One of the goals of Soviet foreign policy at
this time must have undoubtedly been establishing a greater
respectability for the Soviet regime in the post-Stalin
59
era. The Soviet leaders no longer wanted to be considered
as a group of scheming backroom revolutionaries, but rather
as statesmen. At the same time, fear of a further expansion
of Soviet power, as had taken place under Stalin in the
post-war period, was contributing to the maintenance of a
large U.S. military presence in Europe, and if the image
of the Soviet Union could be improved, they hoped that the
U.S. presence in Europe could be reduced and thereby allow
greater Soviet influence in European affairs. As explained
by Malenkov in a foreign policy speech on August 8, 1953,
"if the North Atlantic Bloc is being now, in a tense






international situation, rent by internal struggle and
contradictions, the situation might deteriorate, with the
reduction of that tension, as far as the disintegration of
the bloc." 60
E. THE CHINESE FACTOR
Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence in this
period was not just aimed at the West. Khrushchev wanted to
heal the growing rift in Sino-Soviet relations, and to attempt
to offset Mao's growing influence in Far Eastern affairs.
While the Chinese claim that their differences with the
Soviet Union arose from the destalinization movement and
change in the doctrine of the inevitability of war enunciated
at the Soviet Twentieth Party Congress, the following factors
were irritating Sino-Soviet relations at this time: "Maoist
chauvinism," different revolutionary experiences, different
political environments, economic differences, military
61inequities and separate revolutionary interest.
Only three and one half weeks after Stalin's death, an
agreement on trade and economic assistance was signed between
China and the U.S.S.R. In September, 19 54, Khrushchev and
Bulganin travelled to Peking to visit with Mao, thus acknowl-
edging the importance the Soviet leadership placed on
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Sino-Soviet relations. These wide-ranging talks ended with
the return of Port Arthur to China's control, the dissolut-
ion of joint Sino-Soviet companies which had been exploit-
ing the resources of China, and a further increase in the
scope of Soviet technical assistance to the Chinese. The
new Soviet leaders were prudently removing sources of irri-
tation to the Chinese, and trying to ensure continued Chinese
cooperation by means of assistance rather than threats.
The estrangement between Mao and Stalin had led the
former to begin emphasizing his own communist and national
interests in the Far East. The Chinese gave support to the
North Koreans, the rebels in Indochina, and called for the
repatriation of Quemoy, Matsu and the island of Taiwan,
without regard for the desires or advice of the Moscow
leadership. The Chinese acknowledged the Soviet Union as
^ft
the "core" of the Communist world, but not as the supreme
leader. Accordingly, the Soviet offers to help develop
China's industry and armed forces, to educate Chinese stu-
dents in the Soviet Union, etc., were not magnanimous gestures,
but rather, shrewdly calculated attempts to establish a
basis for Soviet influence in, and eventual control of,
Chinese affairs. If there was no dependence, there could
be no control, and the Soviet Union, then, as now, wanted
c 2
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to exercise a certain degree of control over "fraternal"
Communist states.
F. THE SOVIET ECONOMY
Analyzing the renewed Soviet interest in peaceful co-
existence during an interview in July, 1955, John Foster
Dulles, the U.S. Secretary of State, expressed his opinion
that:
The Soviets are overextended and now they are seek-
ing for new policies, policies which will grant them
some respite against strains which they have been
under in trying to do all of the things which they
felt they needed to do in order to keep up with the
pace which has been set by the free world... They have
been constantly hoping and expecting our economy was
going to collapse. . .on the contrary, it has been their
system that is on the point of collapsing and our
system is going along strong and vigorous. 63
Dulles felt that economic problems were one of the major
reasons for Soviet interest in a relaxation of tensions at
this time, and this is seemingly affirmed by Molotov's state-
ment to Dulles in San Francisco that the Soviets wanted to
discuss disarmament, European security and economic cooper-
ation at Geneva.
Although Soviet civilian industrial output was growing
65
at an annual rate of 10-11% between 1954 and 1957, Soviet
63U.S. News and World Report , July 15, 1955, p. 19.
64 See page 43, note 53.
65
Rush Greenslade and Phyllis Wallace, "Industrial Pro-
duction in the USSR," Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power
(Washington: GPO, 1962) . Cited in Lincoln Bloomfield,
et al. , Khrushchev and the Arms Race (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 1966), p. 227.
51

agricultural production was experiencing problems, necessi-
tating the import of wheat from Canada, meat from France and
sugar from Cuba (note: this is before Castro's time). Given
the Soviet achievements in rocketry in 1957, this period un-
doubtedly required a great increase in investment for the
development of rocket and nuclear weapons technologies.
Malenkov, a proponent of increased investment in light indus-
try and agriculture to raise the standard of living of the
Soviet people, resigned in February, 1955, when it became
clear that the investment required by heavy industry for
rearmament precluded the further development of light indus-
try. While Bulganin replaced Malenkov as Chairman of the
Council of Ministers, Khrushchev was increasingly acknowledged
as the strong man in the Soviet leadership. Khrushchev
proceeded with the development of heavy industry and rearma-
ment while attempting to keep investment in light industry
about constant. He could manage the increased investment
in advanced weapons by cutbacks in the rubles allotted for
conventional forces, only if he could keep the army happy.
In order to be successful in this budgetary juggling, an
era of low threat was needed.
G. BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS
The policy of peaceful coexistence, the question of the
inevitability of war, and the resultant implications for
defense spending and economic development were major factors
in the bureaucratic power struggle between Malenkov and
52

Khrushchev which occurred between 1953 and 1955. Malenkov
and his supporters believed that mutual deterrence was the
best guarantee of peace and that if a nuclear war did take
place it would lead to "the destruction of world civilization."
Their reliance on deterrence implied minimal expenditures on
strategic nuclear weapons and the ability to use scarce
economic resources to raise the standard of living of the
Soviet people. Khrushchev and his supporters, on the other
hand, viewed the reliance on a policy of deterrence as a
policy of complacency which could lead to disaster. Khrushchev
favored the more expensive policy of superiority, and, while
admitting that both sides would suffer extensive destruction
in a nuclear war, he felt that the war was still winable.
Malenkov was demoted from his position as Chairman of
the Council of Ministers in February, 1955, and immediately
his views on mutual deterrence came under open attack. Khrushchev
and his supporters stressed the need to build a strong nuclear-
armed military force and maintain high rates of investment
in heavy industry. However, after Khrushchev had gained the
upper hand in the power struggle and reinforced his position
by means of the Geneva summit, his views on nuclear war evolved
to such an extent that they were virtually indistinguishable
from Malenkov' s: "...war must be prevented because, if it
breaks out in this day and age, it will bring disaster to the
66Herbert Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union (New York
Praeger Publishers, 1959), pp. 18-23, 71.
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whole planet... War would do as much harm to the socialist
countries as it would to anyone else."
Khrushchev and Malenkov were both impressed by the des-
tructiveness of nuclear weapons and the need for the Soviet
Union to peacefully coexist with the West. Khrushchev's
victory in the power struggle was not determined by his
adherence to or rejection of the general line of peaceful
coexistence, but on how he manipulated the military and
heavy industrial sectors to back his policy of peace through
strength.
H. OTHER FACTORS
With all of the U.S. election rhetoric about containment
and rollback, and lacking official recognition of the satell-
ite status of Eastern Europe, the Soviet leaders were hoping
that an era of relaxed tensions would help them to obtain
Western acceptance of the status quo in Eastern Europe. This
would lessen the Soviet fear of Western intervention in their
sphere of interest in the event of any future uprisings like
those in East Germany in June, 1953.
Another possible cause for increased Soviet interest in
peaceful coexistence with the West (and East) was the Soviet
desire to put more of their emphasis and resources into
supporting national liberation struggles in Asia, Africa and
fi 7
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Latin America. The cost and risks of attempting to spread
Communism into Western Europe were too high, and the prospects
for success appeared much brighter in the Third World.
I . SUMMARY
The post-Stalin leadership of the Soviet Union perceived
a number of internal and external threats in the period
under consideration. They were inexperienced in inter-
national affairs and unsure of their ability to control
their own population and those of the satellites. The United
States was engaged in a significant arms buildup as a result
of the Korean War and the perceived Communist threat, and
the U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, was calling
for a policy of "containment" and "rollback" of Communism.
West Germany, the larger and stronger portion of Russia's
historical enemy in Europe, was going to be rearmed and inte-
grated into the NATO alliance. A significant number of
differences had arisen between the Soviets and the Chinese,
and the new Soviet leaders were worried about preserving the
appearance (and reality) of unity in the Communist camp. The
Soviet economy still had not recovered from the depravations
of World War II, and the Soviet leaders were questioning the
need, and their ability, to continue heavy investment in the
defense sector. These threats to the stability of their sys-
tem significantly contributed to the interest of the Soviet
leaders in pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence. This
interest was specifically manifested in the Soviet disarmament
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proposal of May 10, 1955, the Austrian peace treaty, signed
on May 15, 1955, and the attitudes of the Soviet delegates
at the Geneva talks in July 1955. Peaceful coexistence and
a change in the Soviet doctrine of the inevitability of
war were major themes of the Twentieth Party Congress of
the CPSU in 1956.
The concern of the Soviet leaders for maintaining the
image of cooperation with the West waned in late 1956 as a
result of the Hungarian uprising, unrest in Poland, and the
Suez crisis. At the same time, there were differences in
the Soviet leadership concerning Khrushchev's policies,
leading to the June, 1957 expulsion of the "anti-party group"
of Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Shelipin for opposing
"the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence," relaxation
of international tension, and of "catching up with the United
States." 68
In August, 19 57 the first Soviet ICBM was tested and in
October of that year Sputnik I was launched, demonstrating
the Soviet achievement in long-range rocketry, and containing
a veiled threat to the West. In 1958 there was an increase
of tensions over the Mideast, Far East and Berlin, the latter
resulting in Khrushchev issuing an ultimatum on November 27,
1958 giving the West six months to sign a final treaty on
the German question. As the Soviet leaders became more sure
c o
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of themselves, and militarily stronger and more confident,
the "spirit of Geneva" began to appear as just a temporary
pause in the Cold War.
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IV. THE SPIRIT OF CAMP DAVID
The renewed Soviet interest in promoting peaceful co-
existence during the 1958-1960 period has often been over-
looked, or combined with the detente approach which cul-
minated in the signing of a number of agreements between
the United States and the Soviet Union in 1963. However,
this period merits its own analysis. Because the "spirit
of Geneva" faded so rapidly, it is interesting to note the
reasons for Khrushchev's quick return to the soft line of
peaceful coexistence.
On March 31, 1958 Khrushchev became Premier, once again
uniting the position of head of the Soviet government with
that of head of the Soviet Communist Party. One of his
first gestures towards the West in 1958 was contained in a
letter to Eisenhower, dated 2 June, in which Khrushchev
explains that he is striving to expand the supply of con-
sumer goods and housing for the Soviet people, and that he
would like to see a "considerable increase in U.S. - Soviet
69trade" to help bring this about.
Khrushchev's second major interaction with the West in
1958 occurred on November 27 when he tried to use a crude
form of nuclear blackmail by issuing an ultimatum to the
69




Western Powers that they had six months to find a final
solution for the problem of a divided Berlin. The West
responded by agreeing to a Foreign Ministers' conference on
Germany and the Berlin situation that was held between May
and August 1959. When it appeared that nothing would result
from this conference, Eisenhower sent a personal note directly
to Khrushchev inviting him "to pay a friendly visit to the
70United States.
"
Premier Khrushchev spent two weeks touring the United
States in September 1959, ending his trip with a three-day
conference with Eisenhower at Camp David, Maryland. The
amicable exchange of views during this conference led to an
apparent relaxation of tension that was called the "spirit
of Camp David." At the same time, Khrushchev published an
article in the October issue of Foreign Affairs (released
in September, just prior to his visit) entitled "On Peaceful
Coexistence," in which he attempted to explain the peaceful
intent of Soviet foreign policy to the American intellectual
community.
The Camp David meeting was intended to act as a weather-
vane to determine whether a meeting of the heads of state
of the Big Four would be worthwhile. Khrushchev's attitude,
as perceived by Eisenhower, showed hope for successful
70N.S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, The Last




high-level diplomacy, and after Camp David a Big Four summit
meeting was scheduled for May 1960 in Paris.
Khrushchev's renewed interest in peaceful coexistence
was the result of a number of latent threats that he and
the other Kremlin leaders perceived at this time: bureau-
cratic politics, European security problems, the strategic
balance, the state of the Soviet economy, and the growing
Sino-Soviet rift.
A. BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS
Khrushchev was nearly ousted from power by his Presidium
colleagues in June, 1957. The vote was 7-4 against him, but
Khrushchev managed to remain in power by his appeal to the
Central Committee which had been quickly assembled by his
supporters. Khrushchev then turned the tables against his
opponents, and the leaders of the "anti-party group,"
Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich, were ousted for opposition
to the party line, especially in regards to the policy of
peaceful coexistence. However, Khrushchev's victory was
not complete, because the members of the anti-party group
lost only their current Presidium positions. When Khrushchev
attempted to have these men stripped of their party member-
ship at the Twenty-first Party Congress in January, 1959,
his desires were ignored.
Lincoln Bloomfield, Walter Clemens, and Franklyn
Griffiths, Khrushchev and the Arms Race (Cambridge, Mass
MIT Press, 1966), p. 164.
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Another indication of the tenuousness of Khrushchev's
position was the fact that the Central Committee membership
was not changed at the Twenty-first Party Congress. Central
Committee membership usually reflects a certain amount of
patronage on the part of Presidium members: each Presidium
member has his own group of supporters in the Central Com-
mittee/ and when a Presidium member is dismissed, his pro-
teges in the Central Committee are usually dismissed also.
Thus, Central Committee membership usually reflects the
balance of power among factions in the Presidium. The fact
that Central Committee membership remained the same after
the Twenty-first Party Congress was a significant indicator
of the weakness of Khrushchev's position. While 22 of the
122 voting members of the Central Committee were out of
favor at this time, they still maintained and exercised
72their perogatives as Central Committee members. Khrushchev's
position was not nearly as secure as he would have liked it.
Khrushchev's reputation and tenure in office was heavily
dependent on his ability to maintain the situation of peace-
ful coexistence, the policy adopted by the leadership at
the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956. The Chinese were ques-
tioning the correctness of this course and the revision of
the Leninist doctrine on the inevitability of war. The seven
year plan for 1959-1966 called for massive increases in
7 2





consumer goods output in order to catch up and surpass the
United States. This, tied with nuclear weapons and ICBM
production, necessitated Khrushchev's decision to reduce
the size of the Soviet armed forces by 1.2 million men
73between January, 1960 and late 1961. In order to bring
this all about, Khrushchev needed the support of the ranking
military personnel and a successful policy of peaceful
coexistence.
Although Khrushchev had apparently overcome the challenge
to his position, he was not firmly in control. He desper-
ately sought a summit meeting with the leaders of the United
States, England and France to engage in high-level, publicity
generating politics. Khrushchev's trip to the U.S., the
first by a ruling Soviet leader, was highly publicized both
in the Soviet Union and in the satellites. This undoubtedly
was to assure the Soviet public, Presidium and leaders of
the bloc countries that Nikita Sergeievich was a statesman,
respected by the leaders of the capitalist West, and a man
who deserved to represent the Soviet Union both at home and
abroad. It is common political practice to use summitry to
raise the public opinion of a leader at home, and this was
of the utmost importance to Khrushchev at this time. His
position in the leadership was insecure, and the reinforcement
73Khrushchev's speech to the General Assembly of the




of the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence by means of a
summit meeting would lessen the political threat, and more
firmly entrench him in the Soviet power structure.
B. EUROPEAN SECURITY
Being the largest state in Europe which twice
in the course of one generation was subjected
to invasion over its western borders, the Soviet
Union, naturally, cannot but show unremitting
concern over security in Europe which is insep-
erable from its own security. 4
Prior to and during the Geneva Summit in 1955, the Soviet
Union was willing to discuss German reunification. The final
document of the Geneva Summit included the following:
The Heads of Governments, recognizing their
common responsibility for the settlement of
the German question and the re-unification of
Germany, have agreed that the settlement of the
German question and the re-unification of
Germany by means of free elections shall be
carried out in conformity with the national
interests of the German people and the interests
of European security. "7 5
However, when the Soviet Union, in December, 1957,
started calling for another summit meeting, German reuni-
fication was not on the agenda. What concerned the Soviet
Union then was the possible transfer of American nuclear
weapons to the NATO allies, especially West Germany. The
Soviets therefore proposed a nuclear free zone which would
74 . ...Note from Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister to the American
Ambassador, on European Security, July 15, 1958. U.S. Con-
gress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, Documents








consist of the FRG, GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The
U.S. response was a stressing of the need for German reuni-
fication. In February the Soviets responded to the U.S.,
proposing a German peace treaty as part of the summit, but
stating that "the question of unification cannot be the
77
subject of consideration" at the summit. The Soviet stress
was on security from atomic threats from NATO, and a western
ratification of the status quo in Germany.
The German question became a sticking point in the
summit preparations. Although Khrushchev desired (needed)
a summit at almost any cost, the reunification of Germany
was just too much to ask. Out of a sense of utter frustra-
tion Khrushchev issued an ultimatum on November 27, 1958,
giving the West six months to sign a final treaty on Germany.
Khrushchev, speaking in Leipzig on March 7, 1959,
explained the Soviet interest in solving the German problem
this way:
Why then do we nevertheless attach such great
significance to the German problem? Because it
is the focal point of the problem of war and
peace, one of the principal sources of inter-
national friction and conflicts. Great armed
forces of the countries of the West and East
are concentrated in Germany. And when two
armies stand ranged against each other, are in
direct contact, any spark might touch off the
conflagration of war... This must be prevented.
This is why we are pressing, and will continue
76 Ibid







to press consistently for the normalization of
the situation in Germany. 78
The temporary period of bitterness over the German
question passed relatively quickly, and a Foreign Ministers'
conference in preparation for a summit convened in Geneva
in May, 1959. Each side held to their respective positions
on Germany, and little progress was made. Attempting to
break the deadlock, Khrushchev was invited to the United
States to converse with Eisenhower, where "an exchange of
views took place on the question of Germany including the
question of a peace treaty with Germany, in which the posi-
79tions of both sides were expounded." Unfortunately, there
was no easy solution to the differences between East and
West, and the prospects for an agreement on any aspect of the
German problem at the Paris summit in May, 1960, appeared
dim.
The arming of West Germany with nuclear weapons was a
direct security threat to the Soviet Union, especially given
the proximity of Soviet forces to the West German border.
Khrushchev's respect for nuclear weapons and fear of the
8
consequences of a nuclear war are well known. Thus, the
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is understandable as a result of the Soviet obsession with
81
security. The best solution, from the Soviet point of
view, would be a united, communist Germany subordinated
to the U.S.S.R. A satisfactory solution would have been
the creation in central Europe of an "atom free zone" which
incorporated both German states. The most unsatisfactory
solution would have been a reunited, western-oriented
Germany, or a West Germany armed with nuclear weapons and
closely allied with the West. Part of the motivation for
this period of peaceful coexistence was Khrushchev's attempt
to achieve the best solution of the German problem which
was still compatible with the security considerations of
the Soviet Union.
C. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE STRATEGIC BALANCE
A new threat to Soviet security emerged in 1957 when
the United States, at meetings in Bonn in iMay and Paris in
December, proposed to place nuclear weapons in Western
Europe as a part of the NATO arsenal, and to establish bases
for intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM's) on the
territory of the NATO allies. This was a major contributing
factor to a second aspect of the peace offensive which started
with Bulganin's note to President Eisenhower dated December
10, 1957, in which Bulganin decried western over-reaction
81Noted earlier, p. li
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to the success of the Soviet Sputnik program and called
8 2for a summit conference to ease international tension.
The Soviet space successes of 1957 and the implied super-
iority it gave them in ICBM technology stimulated the develop-
ment of a harder foreign policy line by the Soviet Union,
and more and more frequent references to the shift which
they saw occurring in the "correlation of world forces."
Additionally, Soviet writers began to stress the theme
that Soviet advances in strategic rocketry nullified the
strategic advantages formerly held by the United States.
According to Soviet propagandists, the United States had
lost its traditional advantage of relative invulnerability
to direct attack; the importance of strategic aviation, on
which the U.S. was said to rely, was sharply reduced by the
advent of ICBM's, which could deliver nuclear weapons to
distant targets more efficiently and were invulnerable to
existing means of defense; and United States overseas bases,
which could now be destroyed quickly and easily by Soviet
8 3
rockets, had lost their former military value.
The Soviet leaders, seeing that the effect of the Sputnik
and Luna space shots on the U.S., began a program of believeable
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exaggeration and overstatement concerning their strategic
capabilities in order to deceive the West and extract
84
concessions because of their presumed advantage. Thus
Khrushchev delivered his ultimatum on the need to solve the
German question, hoping that Soviet advances in rocket
technology would cause the West to be more yielding. The
Soviet leaders, concerned about threats to their own
security by the nuclear arming of NATO, were trying to play
a deadly game of bluff in order to discredit the United
States in the eyes of her allies, foster U.S. acceptance of
peaceful coexistence on Soviet terms and further Soviet
influence in continental Europe.
D. THE ECONOMY AND DEFENSE
While earlier in the 1950' s the Soviets were having to
spend significant amounts of money on research and develop-
ment for nuclear weapons and rocket systems, by 1959 both had
proven successful and were ready for full-scale production.
Therefore the need for increased military expenditures
continued to grow at the same time that overall Soviet
economic growth was slowing from an annual rate of 10.7%
(1954-1957) to a lower annual rate of 6.7% (1959-1962)
.
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The western notion of Soviet superiority in ICBM's (the
missile gap) thus played directly into Khrushchev's hands.
If he could maintain an atmosphere of peaceful coexistence,
he could continue supporting the development of the Strate-
gic Rocket Forces at the expense of the rest of the military
(especially the army) and continue publicly emphasizing the
civilian sector of the economy. This was incorporated into
Khrushchev's Seven Year Economic Plan of 1959, which was
designed to enable the Soviet Union to overtake the U.S. in
consumer goods. While this plan was adopted at the Twenty-
first Party Congress in January 1959 (prior to the Camp David
meeting) Khrushchev must have certainly been able to use
his Camp David success to persuade his colleagues of the
correctness of this line.
E. THE CHINESE FACTOR
It is difficult to unravel all the intracacies of the
Sino-Soviet dispute, but it appears that in 1959 the secret
arguments between Moscow and Peking were growing hotter (even
while Khrushchev was telling Eisenhower at Camp David that
he and Mao were the best of friends) and the Soviet leaders
were attempting to play their "American card" against the
Chinese.
In 19 53 the Soviets had signed trade and cooperation
agreements with the Chinese, and in 19 57 a secret agreement
was apparently reached in which Moscow promised to give Peking
8 6
atomic "know-how" and a "sample" atomic bomb.
William Griffiths, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1964), p. 351.

In June, 1959, the Soviets changed their minds about
giving nuclear weapons technology to the Chinese because of
the aggressiveness of Mao's attitude towards the West and
Soviet fears of being dragged into a war by Mao's policy.
Mao was declaring that the East wind was prevailing over the
West wind, and that the socialist camp ought to utilize this
new superiority and take decisive actions against the
capitalists. This was completely opposed to Khrushchev's
fear of a nuclear war and his program of peaceful competi-
tion with the West. While Mao advocated increased aggressive-
ness, the realities of nuclear weapons counselled prudence
to Khrushchev. While Eisenhower's memoirs indicate Sino-
87Soviet relations were not discussed at Camp David, the
timing of Khrushchev's visit to the U.S. was sufficient to
arouse increased Chinese ire and accusations of revisionism
and collusion between the Soviet Union and the United States.
F . SUMMARY
Soviet achievements in the fields of nuclear weapons and
delivery systems gave them an increased measure of self-
confidence in their dealings with the West. However, the
Soviet Union, under Khrushchev's influence, once again returned
to a policy of seeking a relaxation of tensions in East-West
relations. This search for detente was motivated by certain





threats perceived by Khrushchev himself, and the rest of
the Soviet leadership. Khrushchev was not secure in his
position within the leadership and needed a major success
in either foreign or domestic policy to bolster his position.
At this time a renewed emphasis on better East-West rela-
tions promised to give him the success he needed, and at the
same time enable him to appease his domestic supporters by
continuing heavy investment in the military (Strategic Rocket
Forces) while reducing expenditures on conventional forces.
This was to enable him to finance missiles and a small, but
nonetheless significant, increase in consumer industry invest-
ment. The fear of nuclear weapons in the hands of the West
Germans was also a significant factor in motivating the
Soviets towards trying to establish better relations with
the West. Also, the Soviet Union was just starting an arms
buildup, and the Soviet leaders were afraid they would lose
in any sustained arms race and thus wanted to use the propa-
ganda value of peaceful coexistence as a tool to prevent a
corresponding U.S. arms buildup.
Khrushchev's fear of nuclear war is well documented (see
note 80) and the adventuristic policies being proposed by
Mao alarmed him lest the Soviet Union be unwittingly involved
in a war not of their own choosing. This led Khrushchev to
seek better relations with the West, as insurance against
potential damage that Mao might cause.
The detente of 1958-1960 was built on a narrow base which
subsequently crumbled in the Spring of 1960 when an American
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U-2 was shot down while on a mission over the U.S.S.R.
The Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting in Vienna in 1961 was followed
by the surprising erection of the Berlin Wall, the resumption
by the Soviet Union of nuclear testing, and the emplacement
of offensive missiles in Cuba. The "spirit of Camp David"
was only a momentary pause in the Cold War.
72

V. THE MOSCOW ACCORDS
The Soviet Union had failed to intimidate the West into
accommodation by a show of force over Berlin in 1961 and
by the installation of offensive missiles in Cuba in 1962.
Caught up in a hopeless dispute with Communist China, suffer-
ing from a sense of strategic inferiority vis-a-vis the U.S.,
and struggling with a slowing economic growth rate and poor
harvests, the Soviet Union, in late 1962 and early 1963, once
again began to pursue a much more conciliatory and cooperative
line towards the West.
The first indication of change was in a letter from
Khrushchev to Kennedy on December 19, 1962 (after the Cuban
crisis) which showed a definite softening of the Soviet line
in the area of arms control. In this letter Khrushchev
modified the traditional Soviet policy against on-site inspec-
tions and agreed to "two or three" such inspections per year
88
as a part of a disarmament agreement. In June 1963 the
hot-line agreement was signed, and the jamming of Voice of
American broadcasts ceased. On August 5, 1963 the Soviet
Union, the United States and Britain signed a limited nuclear
test ban treaty. This was followed by a series of other
minor agreements and accommodations which indicated to the
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West the the U.S.S.R. was serious about becoming more
cooperative, i.e., an agreement to refrain from orbiting
nuclear weapons in space, a multi-lateral treaty, sponsored
by the U.N., on the rights of all states to explore outer
space, the dropping of a Soviet call for the reorganization
of the U.N. Secretariat along "troika" lines and the accep-
tance of U Thant as the new U.N. General Secretary, and
finally a pledge by the leaders of the Soviet Union, United
States and Britain to cutback the production of fissionable
material. This lessening of international tension and in-
crease in East-West cooperation lasted up to Khrushchev's
ouster, and was the Soviet response to a combination of
external and internal factors as described below.
A. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE STRATEGIC BALANCE
The Soviet emplacement of medium and intermediate range
ballistic missiles in Cuba in the Fall of 1962 was an
attempt by the Soviet Union to quickly and inexpensively
alter the strategic balance in their favor. The spectacular
missile crisis, the real danger of a nuclear war, and the
Soviet capitulation in the face of a determined U.S. response
made a very real and deep impression on the Soviet leaders.
The following period "marked the lowest level of tension




Marshall Shulman, "Recent Soviet Foreign Policy: Some
Patterns in Retrospect," Erik Hoffman and Frederic Fleron, „
The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago: Aldine
Publishing Co., 1971), p. 456.
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The missile gap, which had figured so prominently in
the 1960 presidential campaign, suddenly ceased to exist in
September, 1961 when it was revealed that the Soviet Union,
rather than possessing "on the order of 200" operational
90ICBMs, actually had "well under 50". This, however, did
not slow the American strategic buildup which began with
Kennedy's assumption of office, and contributed to the Soviet
gamble of placing missiles in Cuba. An MRBM or IRBM in Cuba
would have the same strategic impact as an ICBM based in the
U.S.S.R.
The backing down of the Soviet Union in the face of U.S.
military superiority in October, 1962 deeply frustrated the
Soviet leaders, and led Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister
Kuznetzov to declare: "Never will we be caught like this
91
again." Their inability to militarily back their foreign
policy became a contributing factor to this new era of detente,
The Soviet Union had two choices: to compete in an all out
arms race with the U.S., or to attempt to slow the competition
while continuing to build up their own military forces at a
rate they could more easily afford. Not having the ability
or the resources to match the U.S. in an all out arms race,
the Soviets chose the latter course, attempting to slow U.S.
and NATO defense efforts by a lessening of the apparent
90Joseph Alsop, Washington Post , September 25, 1961,
91John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), p. 68.
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threat. In April 1964 the Pentagon released their best
estimate of the strategic balance at that time, showing the
U.S. to possess 540 long range bombers compared to 270 for
the Soviet Union, and 750 ICBMs compared to a Soviet total
92
of 188. This gave the U.S. a 4:1 advantage in the strate-
gic balance, and the gap showed no signs of becoming narrower.
In addition to the reassuring political moves made by
the Soviet Union throughout 1963, in December Khrushchev
announced a 4 1/2 percent reduction in the Soviet defense
93budget for 1964, and the resumption of troop cutbacks -
moves intended to influence public opinion in the West, and
allow greater emphasis on the economic problems at home.
The widening gap in the strategic balance between the
U.S. and U.S.S.R. and the inability of the Soviet Union to
militarily support her foreign policy were threats which the
Soviet Union could not long endure. The 1963-1964 period
of detente was the Soviet answer to these threats.
B. THE SOVIET ECONOMY
Soviet economic performance in 196 2-1963 was worse than
in any other period in the postwar era. Poor weather led
to a severe contraction in the agricultural sector, producing
10 percent less in 1963 than in 1962. Using Soviet statistics,
the rate of industrial growth fell to 8 percent (it had
92
U.S. Department of Defense Statement ot U.S. -Soviet
Strategic Balance, April 14, 1964, New York Times , April
15, 1964, p. 1.
9 3Pravda, December 16, 1963; Izvestia, December 15, 1963
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averaged 10 percent or better since 19 50) , the investment
in heavy industry only increased 9 percent (compared to
11 percent or better since 1950) , the investment in consumer
goods increased only 5 percent (compared to 7 percent per
year for the past three years), and the Soviet GNP , again
using their figures, only increased 5 percent, the lowest
94
rate in ten years.
A CIA analysis of the same period indicated that the
growth rate of the Soviet economy in 1962 and 1963 had
fallen from the postwar average of 6-10 percent per year to
a low of 2.5 percent, and attributed this decline to: a -
shift of investment priorities away from heavy industry to
more technologically demanding areas such as chemical and
fertilizer production and a diversified mix of consumer
goods, "a very large increase in military and space spending"
(which is anti-growth in that it takes resources and personnel
away from productive investment) , and the serious decline in
agricultural output in 1962 and 1963. Soviet food production
in 1964 was expected to be only 3 percent greater than in
1956, while on a per capita basis it was 7-8 percent less
than in 19 56 due to the growth of the Soviet population.
Additionally, wheat output in 1963 was 10 million tons less
than in 1962. 95
94Central Statistical Agency of the U.S.S.R., cited in
Howard J. Sherman, The Soviet Economy (Little, Brown and
Co.: Boston, 1969), p. 109.
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"CIA Report on the Soviet Economy," New York Times
January 8, 19 64, p. 1.
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The combination of a decreasing rate of economic growth,
agricultural failures, the rising expectations of Soviet
consumers, and the perceived need to bolster defense spending
in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis led to another
internal debate on resource allocation in the Soviet economy.
Khrushchev adopted the view that military expenditures should
be held back to allow the civilian sector of the economy to
grow:
Whereas during the period of the first five-year plans
and in the postwar years we laid chief stress on the
development of heavy industry as the basis for building
up the economy of the entire country and on strengthening
its defense capability, now, when we have a mighty
industry, when the defense of the country is at a
suitable level, the Party is setting the task of more
rapid development of the sectors of the economy that
produce consumer goods. 96
An economic crisis was developing in the Soviet Union,
and necessitated that the leadership make specific hard
choices. Khrushchev came out in favor of restraining defense
spending to concentrate on the agricultural and consumer
sectors, and this necessitated an era of peaceful coexistence
with the West.
C. THE CHINESE FACTOR
Despite Khrushchev's assurances to Eisenhower at Camp
97
David in 1959 that he and Mao were the best of friends,
96
N.S. Khrushchev, "Main Directions for Drawing Up the Plan
for Development of the National Economy in the Period Immediately
Ahead," Pravda, October 2, 1964. Cited in Thomas Wolfe, "Impact
of Khrushchev's Downfall on Soviet Military Policy and
Detente," Detente: Cold War Strategies In Transition , ed.
by Dulles and Crane, p. 28 5.
97Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace , p. 44 5.

they were not, and the differences between the U.S.S.R. and
China continued to worsen, culminating in an open break in
98
mid-1963. Besides the animosity over the Soviet reluctance
to fulfill a promise to China to provide them with a sample
99
atomic weapon and the technical plans for production, the
Chinese disagreed with destalinization and its implications
for the Communist world, and they accused the Soviet Union
of "revisionism" in Khrushchev's "tampering" with the teach-
ings of Lenin on the inevitability of war. Added to this
were Chinese accusations of Soviet faintheartedness and lack
of revolutionary fervor after backing down over Cuba in
19 62, and generally failing to support a more adventuristic
line in confronting the imperialist states in the current
era. Minor differences which existed before Stalin's death
were exacerbated by Khrushchev's destalinization campaign,
Soviet claims that their 's was the only true road to socialism,
and the different social conditions in the two communist
giants. There was also a factor of hegemony in the dispute:
the Soviets were attempting to gain/maintain control over
China's foreign and nuclear defense policies through mili-
tary aid to China and non-proliferation treaties with the
West, and the Chinese, with a recent past history of foreign
98
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September 13, 1963, p. 12.
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hegemony and exploitation, wanted nothing to do with
Soviet control. At the same time, China was making her
first incursions into Africa, and encouraging Eastern
European countries, such as Albania and Rumania, to pursue
a more independent foreign policy line.
Soviet aggravation with China was both a cause and a
result of the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence with
the West: a cause of the Soviet turning towards the West
in that the Soviets did not want hostile neighbors on both
her eastern and western borders and it was easier to pla-
cate the West than the Chinese; and a result in that the
revision of the Leninist doctrine on the inevitability of
war and the Soviet desire to peacefully coexist with West
directly contradicted Chinese interpretations of what
Marxism-Leninism was all about. Khrushchev feared that Mao
would get the Soviet Union involved in a confrontation with
the West, and therefore sought to reduce the possibility of
this occurrence by establishing better relations with the
West.
D. EUROPEAN SECURITY
Through all the phases of Soviet foreign policy
since the October revolution Germany has been of pri-
mary importance. .. the hope of winning over Germany,,
fear of Germany, alliance with Germany, war with
Germany ... For Russia the German question is 90 percent
of her foreign policy. 10^
G.F. Hudson, "Soviet Soft Line Towards the West,"
Current History, October 1963, p. 234.
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The Soviet actions in erecting the Berlin Wall in
August 1961 showed their frustrations over attempts to
solve the postwar German problem to their satisfaction.
In early 1963 the U.S. defense planners began talking of
a NATO multilateral nuclear force, in which allied states
would be provided with nuclear weapons under U.S. control.
This was an attempt to appease French and German ambitions
for nuclear weapons, and yet guarantee the Soviets that
the Germans would not have possession and control of nuclear
weapons.
Throughout the Fall of 1963 the Soviet press was full
of articles decrying the possibility of West Germany
obtaining control of nuclear weapons. One example will
suffice to show the seriousness of the Soviet concern:
One cannot, on the one hand, declare one's readiness
to continue the search for peace, to turn the present
pause in the "cold war"... into a period of fruitful
cooperation. . .while on the other hand meeting the West
German revanchists halfway and gratifying their nuclear
appetite through the creation of multilateral nuclear
NATO forces, which would open the doors of the nuclear
arsenal to the West German militarists.
Soviet leading circles are naturally obliged to take
into consideration the dangerous consequences of the
nuclear armament of the FRG ... Thought should also be
given to the fact that the dangerous steps undertaken in
NATO are bound to exert a negative influence on the still
weak shoots of mutual understanding and trust among states,
and consequently, to have an unfavorable effect on
searches for a solution to the problem of strengthening
general peace. *-®*-
"Do Not Give Bonn Revanchists Access to Nuclear Weapons,"
Pravda, October 22, 1963, p. 3. Current Digest of the Soviet
Press, November 13, 1963, p. 21.
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The specter of nuclear armed Germany, regardless of who
actually controlled the weapons, contributed to Soviet
interest in detente at this time.
Using the momentum of the East-West agreements signed in
the Fall of 1963, on January 28, 1964 the Soviet delegation
to the Geneva disarmament talks submitted a list of proposals
"aimed at slowing down the armament race and further lessen-
ing international tension." An analysis of these proposals
reveals much of the underlying Soviet concern for security.
They called for "withdrawal of foreign troops from the terri-
tories of other countries," saying that "of particularly
important significance would be the withdrawal of foreign
troops from the territories of European States." A "reduction
of the total numbers of armed forces of States," and
"reduction of military budgets" was called for, recommending
that the Western Powers follow the lead of the unilateral
military and defense cutbacks Khrushchev announced for the
Soviet Union in December 1963 (which were apparently motivated
by economic, not idealistic goals). The Soviets placed
"special importance" on the "establishment of denuclearized
zones ... in those regions where the danger of nuclear conflict
is greatest, and first and foremost in Central Europe."
Under the proposal on the "prevention of the further spread
of nuclear weapons," the Soviets said it was "particularly
important. .. to close all channels ... through which nuclear
weapons could come into the hands of those who twice during
this century have caused the conflagration of a world war
82

and who are now actively striving to obtain nuclear weapons,"
(i.e., West Germany). The Soviet Union specifically noted
that weapons or information transfers should be prohibited
both directly, and "indirectly ... for example, through the
102
so-called multilateral force of NATO."
This reveals the primal Soviet fear of a nuclear-armed
West Germany, and was a strong factor in the Soviet desire
for a lessening of tension during this period. At the same
time, the Soviet Union continued making overtures towards
de Gaulle, trying to use the forces of reduced international
tension and French nationalism to hasten the destruction of
NATO from internal rivalries.
E. BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS
The Cuban missile crisis was a terrible blow to
Khrushchev's position within the party leadership, and the
significant lessening of international tension which followed
can be viewed as his attempt to recover some amount of
stature after such an embarassing setback. Indications of
differences among the Soviet leaders and the changing power
balance in the Politburo occurred on the very first day
of the crisis, as evidenced by Herbert Dinerstein's comparison
of editorial articles in Pravda, Izvestiia, and Red
102Soviet Memorandum Submitted to the Eighteen Nation
Disarmament Committee: Measures for Slowing Down the Arma-
ments Race and Relaxing International Tension, January 28,
1964. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents
on Disarmament, 19 64 (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1965), pp. 12-17.
a**

103Star . Reports on government functions in Pravda no
longer carried Khrushchev's name in a place of honor, but
rather, in alphabetical order with the other Politburo mem-
bers. While a December, 1962 report of a Moscow conference
was entitled "Talks of N.S. Khrushchev with Josip Broz Tito,"
in November, 1963 , after the crisis, report titles read more
like "Meeting of comrades Khrushchev and Suslov with comrade
Zhivkov, " stressing that the collective leadership was
superior to any one person. Michel Tatu, a noted Kremlinolo-
gist, has thoroughly researched this period and concluded
that "the mere opening of the Cuban crisis caused Krhushchev
suddenly to lost ground within the collective leadership.
Although the grave situation and the danger to the country
might have been expected to enhance the chief's stature,
104
the result was the exact opposite."
After the Cuban missile crisis there was a renewed
emphasis on collective leadership in the Soviet Union, a
slowing of destalinization, an attempted rapprochement with
China (February-March 1963), and a slight stiffening of
attitudes towards the West. All of these moves were con-
trary to the policies favored by Khrushchev, and indicated
that his influence was decreasing.
Herbert Dinerstein, The Making of a Missile Crisis:
October 1962 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1976),
pp. 219-223, and 239-273.
104Michel Tatu, Power in the Kremlin (New York: Viking
Press, 1969), pp. 274-275.
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In April 19 63 Khrushchev's main opponent in the Party
leadership, Kozlov, suffered a stroke and disappeared from
the political scene, leading to a resurgence of Khrushchev's
authority, increasing hostility towards China, and a new
accommodation with the West (the Limited Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty of August 1963). Khrushchev reached the zenith of
his career at the June 1963 Party Plenum when the resolution
on China mentioned "for the first and last time in the
Khrushchev era, the 'Presidium of the Central Committee
Headed by Comrade Khrushchev. '
"
F . SUMMARY
As described above, there were a number of significant
threats perceived by the Soviet leaders during this period.
First and foremost of these was the overwhelming military
superiority of the United States and the Soviet inability
to militarily back their foreign policy as demonstrated by
the Cuban crisis. The momentum of the U.S. arms buildup
had to be slowed to a rate which would allow the Soviet
Union, with its growing economic problems, to first of all,
prevent the gap from widening, and secondly, to start to
close the gap. The stationing of nuclear weapons in West
Germany added more fuel to the traditional Soviet (Russian)
fear of Germany, and was considered another threat to Soviet
security. The Sino-Soviet rift of the 1950' s developed into
Michel Tatu, Power in the Kremlin, p. 353.
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an open break, contributing even more uncertainty to the
deliberations of the Soviet leaders. And finally, in the
aftermath of Cuba, Khrushchev's policies were discredited
and he started losing control. The illness of his primary
opponent, Kozlov, enabled Khrushchev to salvage his posi-
tion by once again capitalizing on his reputation as a
supporter of peaceful coexistence. He attempted to do
this by encouraging and joining in another period of relaxed
East-West tensions.
Khrushchev ran into increasing opposition in the Fall of
1964 on such topics as economic priorities, a possible
rapprochement with the Federal Republic of Germany, and the
China problem. He was ousted in October 1964, and immediately
the Soviet Union began to follow a harder line towards the
West. Further attempts were made to better relations with
China, and increased Soviet aid was offered to Vietnam. In
Brezhnev's speech on international relations at the Twenty-
third Party Congress in 1966, peaceful coexistence was not
10 6
even mentioned in the section dealing with America. The
Soviet Union also continued courting de Gaulle, succeeding
in July 1966, when de Gaulle announced France's termination
of military cooperation with NATO.
1 fi




VI. DETENTE AND SALT I
There was more to the detente of 1972 than just the
strategic arms limitation agreements. Three years of U.S.-
Soviet negotiations had contributed to a perceptible lessening
of international tension, and resulted in a significant
number of other intergovernmental accords which were signed
during President Nixon's May 1972 visit to Moscow: the
anti-ballistic missile (ABM) agreement, an agreement to
limit offensive weapons, an enumeration of the basic prin-
ciples of relations between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., and
agreements covering trade, incidents at sea, scientific and
technological cooperation, joint space ventures, health,
protection of the environment, and cultural exchanges. At
the same time, five declarations of cooperative intent were
signed, covering Europe, the Middle East, Indochina, disarma-
ment, and measures to strengthen the U.N. A true and
lasting detente relationship between the U.S. and Soviet
Union appeared in the offing.
There were a number of factors which led to a renewed
Soviet interest in detente in the late 1960's, not the least
of which was the fact that the 20 year treaty establishing
NATO was set to expire in 1969, and, having succeeded in
coaxing de Gaulle to terminate French military cooperation
U.S. Department of State, Weekly Compilation of Presi -
dential Documents, Volume 8, Number 23, June 5, 1972, pp. 934-981

with NATO (1966) , the Soviets were hoping to use a new
detente to hasten NATO's demise. Additional factors which
contributed to a renewed Soviet interest in detente were
Soviet economic problems, security concerns generated by
U.S. strategic innovativeness , Soviet perceptions of U.S.
domestic problems, Soviet perceptions of the effects of
detente on Western Europe, and Soviet apprehensions of
China.
A. THE CONDITION OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY
While American scholars have disagreed over the relative
importance of economic factors as a determinant of Soviet
interest in detente, most scholars agree that economic fac-
tors were important. This is collaborated by frequent refer-
ences in Soviet literature to the economic benefits derived
108from detente. The following paragraphs examine the
state of the Soviet economy during the period of the SALT I
negotiations.
Agricultural productivity has been and continues to be
the most significant and persistent problem of the Soviet
economy, dating back to the early Communist drives to collec-
tivize the peasants. It is a demonstrated fact that farmers
produce more working for themselves than for the collective.
For example, almost all farmers working on a collective farm
108For example, see G. Arbatov, "Soviet-American Relations
and their Prospective Development," Vil'nyus Kommunist
Number 9, September 1975.
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have their own small garden plots which they are allowed
to tend on their off-duty time. These small plots, vestiges
of the free enterprise system, while occupying less than 10
percent of the arable land, account for over "one-quarter
of the total agricultural output, including one-fifth of
109
the crops... as well as one-third of the livestock products."
In addition to motivational factors, the collective farms
are too large and suffer from diseconomies of scale, while
the private plots are too small for efficient economic pro-
duction. Fertilizers, a necessity for intensive agricultural
production, were in short supply, and farm equipment was
and is not as plentiful as in the West. Weather, a problem
for all farmers, is an even more significant factor in the
U.S.S.R. because of its northerly orientation (more than 8
percent of the U.S.S.R. is north of the latitude of Maine).
It is interesting and instructive to note that while 4 per-
cent of the U.S. labor force more than meets domestic food
needs, 24 percent of all Soviet workers are engaged in food




Another problem, allied to the problem of grain produc-
tion, is the lack of animal protein for human consumption.
The Soviet Union does not grow enough grain to feed the animals
109 . .U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee, Soviet Economy
in a New Perspective
,
(Washington: GPO, 1976), p. 592.
Morton Schwartz, The Foreign Policy of the USSR:
Domestic Factors (Encino, Ca. : Dickenson Publishers, 1975),
p. 31.
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required to satisfy the public's demand for meat. While in
the past this scarcity of meat has been alleviated by the
catches of the Soviet fishing fleet, many of the world's
prime fishing areas have been overfished by the Soviets,
reducing current and future catch sizes. The diet of the
typical Russian, although adequate and improving, is not
up to the standards of other developed countries, and is a
source of some domestic dissatisfaction.
The low quantities and inferior quality of Soviet con-
sumer goods is another problem of the Soviet leadership in
as much as it limits the value of monetary incentives for
the workers (since there isn't much to buy), and contributes
to a significant amount of low-level discontent among the
shoppers. For example, the general shortage of, and high
prices paid for automobiles in the Soviet Union is well
documented and led to the construction of the largest
automobile plant in the U.S.S.R. at Volgograd, managed by
FIAT, with the core technology and three-quarters of the
112production equipment supplied from various U.S. firms.
In the industrial sector, the underlying problem is the
inability to mass produce goods incorporating high technology
without sacrificing quality. The U.S.S.R. has demonstrated
Hedrick Smith, The Russians (New York: Ballantine
Books, 1976) , Chapter 1.
Anthony Sutton, Western Technology and Soviet Economic





its ability to manufacture ICBMs and large hydroelectric
turbines, but is unable to meet consumer demand for auto-
mobiles, food and other domestic items. What the Soviets
lack is "the know-how to manufacture in quantity at accept-
able cost and quality, and that is what they want from U.S.
industry ... In meetings with U.S. government officials and
businessmen, Soviet officials have consistently stressed
113their desire to import production technology. The Soviets
have gone so far as to admit that "the U.S.S.R. still lags
behind the U.S.A. in certain types of processing - in the
products of the instrument and electronic industries, plastics,
synthetic fibers, and electric power, and in the level of
114
automation of production and introduction of computers."
Computer technology is another area in which the Soviet
Union is keenly interested in Western assistance. While the
U.S.S.R. has developed highly sophisticated computers for
military applications, the civilian sector (civilian indus-
trial production, financial transactions, stock control,
etc.) is mired down in a growing morass of paperwork.
The efficiency and productivity of Soviet industry was
another area the Soviets admitted problems in. Demographic
analyses indicate that the manpower reserve in the U.S.S.R.
is virtually nonexistent, and that the number of youths
113John Oliver and Elliott Weiss, "Is Selling Technology
to the Soviets Dangerous?" Harvard Business Review
(January-February 1975), p. 18.
114 . . •V.M. Kudrov, "Some Questions on the Economic Competition
Between the U.S.S.R. and U.S.A.," SShA, (No. 9, 1975), p. 7.

available for the workforce (and the military) will be
decreasing in the future. It has been Soviet policy in the
past to increase production by increasing their least
expensive asset - people - while letting their productivity
remain relatively constant. This can no longer be done.
Brezhnev himself has realized this and said that "the
principal task today is to bring about an abrupt change in
orientation, to shift emphasis to intensive methods of
running the economy, and thereby to bring about a serious
improvement in its efficiency. The point is to generate
economic growth more and more by increasing labor produc-
tivity
.
Soviet oil problems, recently receiving much news, were
clearly eivdent in Soviet literature prior to 1974. Insuffic-
ient long-range planning, inadequate capital investment, and
short-sighted extraction techniques headed the list of prob-
lems. The Soviets realized that the net result of these
factors would be a change in their status from that of an
oil exporter to that of an oil consumer by the early 1980' s.
"The Soviet Union is apparently not able to handle the
development of her resources and the requisite industrial
base. Thus the Soviet Union is faced with a profound prob-
lem of finances for economic expansion - which is well above
her means and which is forcing her to seek credits, technology,
L.I. Brezhnev, Speech on the Occasion of the Fiftieth
Anniversary of the Formation of the U.S.S.R., in Kudrov,
op. cit




and assistance in the West." "Soviet publications clearly
show that the recent Soviet push for long-term, low-interest
credits for the acquisition of Western high technology,
equipment, and technological and managerial expertise has
116been motivated primarily by economic necessity."
The overall significance of economic problems to Soviet
interest in detente is not the goal of this analysis, but
more simply to indicate that the shortcomings of the Soviet
economy were a definite factor. Detente, as envisaged by the
Soviets, was seen to mean greater access to Western tech-
nology and a decrease in military spending in the U.S.S.R.
The need for military detente is also determined by a
number of major and pressing problems that mankind faces
at the present stage of historical development ... such
problems as those of food and certain natural resources,
the development of medicine and education, space explora-
tion, the use of the resources of the World Ocean. .
.
Clearly, these problems cannot be dealt with successfully
under conditions of military tension and the senseless
squandering of material resources and man's creative
energy for military purposes . H^
Between 1966 and 1973 the dollar value of total U.S.
exports to the U.S.S.R. increased from $42 million to $1.2
118billion, and while no figures are availble for the U.S.,
the Soviets readily admitted that "machinery and equipment
116
Marianna Slocum, "Soviet Energy - An Internal Assess-
ment," Technology Review (October-November 1974), p. 31.
117
A. Svetlov, "The Soviet Union's Struggle for Military
Detente," International Affairs (No. 2, 1976), p. 98.
118
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Detente (Washington: GPO, 1974), p. 248.
93

make up almost 40 percent of the socialist countries imports
119from the West European countries."
The Soviet leaders were aware of their economic problems
and of consumer dissatisfaction, and detente seemed a promising
answer to both of these problems. "Rather than face the
politically painful choice of instituting substantial economic
reforms, the Soviet leadership has opted for a massive
effort to overcome its shortages by increasing the flow of
120trade, advanced technology, and capital from abroad."
B. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE STRATEGIC BALANCE
The achievement of parity with the United States has
both lessened the perceptions of immediate danger to the
U.S.S.R. and provided the basis for the detente process.
It should be emphasized that despite the umprecedented
military threat now posed by the Soviet buildup, parity
and political equality, in Soviet perceptions, are the
ritual underpinnings for detente. They could not deal
as a political equal with the United States from a
position of inferiority . 121
From the Bolshevik Revolution to the Cold War, the Soviet
Union has always been the underdog. Victory in World War II
gave the Soviets a large psychological boost, and left them
as the second strongest nation in the world. However, while
the Soviet Union maintained an enormous standing army, the
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United States took a qualitative lead in the power game
by the stockpiling of atmoic and then nuclear weapons.
The Soviets, however, were not far behind, and gaining
rapidly. The first chain reaction in the U.S. was in
December 1942, a feat not duplicated in the Soviet Union
until December 1947. The first U.S. atomic weapon test was
in July 1945, and the first Soviet one in September 1949.
The Soviets then took the lead and tested the world's first
hydrogen bomb in August, 1953, the U.S. hydrogen bomb first
being tested seven months later (March, 1954). Thus while
the Soviet Union was initially about five years behind the
U.S. in nuclear weapons development in 1942, by 1953 they
had surged slightly ahead.
The year 1957 saw the Soviet Union testing its first
ICBM, with the U.S. 6-8 months behind. Besides having broken
the nuclear monopoly, the U.S.S.R. quickly developed the
delivery systems necessary to threaten both Europe and the
United States.
During the early 1960's there was a great debate in the
United States over the utility of nuclear weapons and the
question "How much is enough?" The Soviets must have watched
this debate with great interest, because while the U.S.
was questioning its policy of deterrence through superiority,
the Soviet leaders were making decisions to accelerate their
arms programs. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations,
under the tutelage of Robert McNamara, gave up the doctrine
of U.S. superiority and adopted a mutual assured destruction/
parity formula, the results of which then allowed the Soviet
95

Union to approach rough strategic parity with the United
States in the late 1960 's.
Towards the end of the 1960's U.S. technological inno-
vativeness in the fields of anti-ballistic missile defense
(ABM) and multiple reentry vehicles (MRV and MIRV) began to
122
worry Soviet leaders. Their GALOSH ABM system was prima-
tive by U.S. standards, and would be completely overwhelmed
by U.S. MIRVs . At the same time, a significant U.S. ABM
deployment would necessitate a large increase in the size of
the Soviet ICBM force if the same effectiveness were to be
maintained. Both U.S. developments were strategically un-
settling, and threatened to set off another round in the
already expensive arms race. The Soviet Union seized upon
SALT as an economical means to counter these U.S. advances.
The Soviet arms buildup had already caused an unequal
development of the military/heavy industry and consumer/
light industry sectors of their economy, and the achievement
of parity was seen by many Soviet intellectuals as an oppor-
tunity to obtain from the West assistance to correct this
deficiency. One Soviet commentator wrote that "for socialism,
international tension and the related threat of imperialist
aggression, constant economic and political pressure and
various kinds of subversive actions from outside mean a
forced necessity to switch a substantial portion of resources
122See John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), pp. 167, 174.
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to defense purposes," and that under detente this would not
123be so.
A constant theme in Soviet writing was that the lessening
of international tension and detente were required by the
socialist states "for the successful construction of social-
ism and communism, (and) for the development of their econo-
124
mies and culture." The "historic shift" in the world
correlation of forces, the achievement of parity with the
U.S., and the limits imposed by SALT, enabled the Soviet
leaders to turn more of their attention to other problems.
C. SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF U.S. DOMESTIC PROBLEMS
There are many astute Soviet students of U.S. affairs,
the most well-known of which is probably Georgi Arbatov,
currently the Director of the Soviet Institute of the United
States and Canada, and a member of the Central Committee of
the CPSU. Dr. Arbatov perceptively analyzed developments
in the U.S. and attributed part of the reason for this
detente to "domestic social, economic and political problems"
in the U.S., and "shifts in the sentiments in the USA"
leading to a "reevaluation of certain values and to new
123
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approaches and priorities." A. Svetlov, another fre-
quent commentator on American affairs, goes as far as saying
that "detente is a result of the moral, political, and
military decline in the West."
Perceiving this loss of American purpose and will, the
Soviets were more than happy to accommodate U.S. interest
in an easing of international tensions. At the same time,
the Soviets were not sure if the American retreat from
world leadership was only a temporary result of the Vietnam
experience, or the beginning of the long awaited exacerba-
tion of the internal contradictions of capitalism. Thus, by
visibly pursuing a period of detente, the Soviet Union could
lull the U.S. into a comfortable sense of security, and con-
tinue working towards their goals, carefully avoiding any
direct threat to the West which might have the effect of
causing a resurgence of American determination and interest
in world affairs.
D. SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE EFFECTS OF DETENTE ON WESTERN
EUROPE
While it is difficult to ascertain what the specific
Soviet intentions towards Western Europe were, there is
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little doubt that the Soviets saw detente as an opportunity
to lessen tensions in Europe, reduce American influence,
and hopefully, fracture the NATO alliance. This they planned
to accomplish, as explained by Dimitri Simes, by trying "to
127improve the Soviet image abroad."
The detente momentum was growing in the mid to late
1960 's, and culminated in the June 27, 1968 announcement by
the Soviet Union that they would participate in strategic
arms limitation talks with the United States. While SALT is
not exactly synonomous with detente, it was the visible
embodiment of the detente process. However, at this time
the Soviets were becoming increasingly alarmed over events
in Czechoslovakia, and there can be no doubt that the Soviet
decision to invade Czechoslovakia in late 1968 was a painful
one, not only because of its effects in Communist countries
and on non-ruling communist parties, but also because it
demonstrated to the West and NATO the capabilities of the
Soviet armed forces in Europe. As a result of the Soviet
desires to ease tensions in Europe, and undoubtedly in an
attempt to negate the impressions caused by the 1968 crisis,
the Soviet Union, in 1969, proposed an all-European security
conference, later dubbed CSCE, the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe. The apparent Soviet goals of
their CSCE proposal were expressed by Brezhnev in a speech
127 .... . .Dimitri Simes, Detente and Conflict: Soviet Foreign






in April 1970 in which he proposed a "realistic program
to strengthen European peace by providing for rejecting the
use of force or threat of its use, recognizing the terri-
torial status quo in Europe as it has formed since World
War II, developing mutually advantageous trade, economic,
scientific, technical, and cultural relations between all
128
nations and states in Europe."
By lowering tensions in Europe, appearing less hostile,
and encouraging cooperation, the Soviets hoped to obtain
for themselves a larger voice in European affairs, and at
the same time, lessen the American role in that area. The
new Soviet image was intended to cause questioning in the
European capitals of the necessity for large defense expendi-
tures, and weaken (and ultimately destroy) the NATO alliance.
The Soviets then hoped to make this process irreversible
through trade and cooperative development agreements.
Particular emphasis should be laid on the emergence
of a principally new form of contracts: cooperation on
a compensation basis. It consists of expanding the out-
put of certain goods in socialist countries with credits
provided by their Western partners in the form of plant
and materials with subsequent payment of these credits...
by deliveries of produce. .. for long terms... ten, twenty,
or more years. ^29
East-West cooperation has already developed along these
lines in the natural gas and chemical industries, and the
Soviet Union went so far as to propose combining Western
128 Kurt L. London, "The Soviet Union and Western Europe,"
Current History (October 1970), p. 200.
129
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International Affairs (No. 8, 1975), p. 63.

Europe's nuclear technology with Eastern Europe's power
transmission technology to construct a vast nuclear/electric
grid supplying power throughout the whole European area.
This in effect would have given many Western European coun-
tries a serious vested interest in the maintenance of
detente. One could easily imagine the intense lobbying
efforts that would ensue from a Soviet threat to renege on
this type of agreement!
Besides the security and economic aspects of detente in
Europe, there was also the ideological. In times of height-
ened East-West tensions, non-ruling communist parties have,
in the past, suffered from governmental persecution and a
general lack of popularity. Under conditions of detente,
however, local communist parties have flourished in Europe
and elsewhere, and have been legalized and often recognized
as major political powers. This has made things much easier
for communists to infiltrate and subvert existing governments.
It is hard to distinguish between intentions and by-products,
but Soviet writers note that "The East-West detente and
cooperation are creating favorable conditions for the working
class struggle in the industrialized capitalist states,
131
and for the national liberation movement."
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Soviet interest in detente in the European area also
seemed to be inexorably linked with the Sino-Soviet dispute,
which will be discussed in the next section.
E. THE CHINESE FACTOR
While U.S. Secretaries of State and National Security
Advisors speak of playing the "China card," there are
virtually no references in available Soviet literature on
the relationship between Soviet desire for detente with the
West, and the Soviet need to counterbalance her problems
with China in the East. The majority of existing analyses
are the result of scholarly speculation.
There is a deeply rooted historical animosity between
the Russians and Chinese which is expressed in terms of
the "mongol-Tatar yoke," the "yellow peril," and "unequal
treaties." The modern Sino-Soviet dispute traces its origins
to Khrushchev's destalinization campaign and the Soviet
revision of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on the inevita-
bility of war between the capitalist and socialist systems.
In the late 19 50' s the Chinese challenged the Soviet model
of socialist development through the "Great Leap Forward,"
and the simmering Sino-Soviet differences were exacerbated
in 1960 when Khrushchev cut off Soviet economic aid to China.
The Chinese loudly denounced the Soviet Union's handling of
the Cuban missile crisis, and called it "another Munich."
Small-scale border skirmishes in the early 1960 's were given
increased significance by a 1964 statement of Mao that China
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had "not yet presented its account" for the Chinese lands
132taken by Russia during tsarist times.
The detonation of the first Chinese nuclear weapon in
October 1964 seemed to increase the intensity of the
polemics associated with the differences between the U.S.S.R.
and P.R.C. While the animosity between the two countries
simmered during the period of the Cultural Revolution, the
1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia "alarmed Peking more
133than anything that Moscow had done to date." The Chinese
saw the Brezhnev Doctrine as a direct threat to their pur-
suing their own path of socialist development and were
deeply affected. Late in 1968 the Twelfth plenum of the
Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee met in prepara-
tion for the Ninth Party Congress of April 1969. These events
announced the end of the Cultural Revolution, the consolida-
tion of Mao's rule, and the "impending return of China as
an active force on the world stage - with an undiminished
134
attitude of fanatical hostility towards the Soviet Union."
The Chinese ambush of a Soviet patrol along the Ussuri River
132Morton Schwartz, The Foreign Policy of the U.S.S.R.
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in March 19 69 was an indication of Peking's concern and
desire to show the Soviets that they were not easily
intimidated, and led to a devastating retaliatory attack
by the Soviet Union, and the massive Soviet arms buildup
along the 4500 mile Sino-Soviet border.
The full intensity of the Soviet fear of the Chinese
can be seen in the attempts by the Soviet Union, starting
in 1969, to "enlist the United States in an agreement to
take joint action with the Soviet Union in the event of
'provocative action 1 by a third nuclear power - presumably
China." The Soviet leaders apparently saw a greater
danger on the Eastern front than on the Western front, and
thus wanted to do everything in their power to stabilize
conditions in Europe in anticipation of difficulties with
China. The Chinese not only posed a military threat to the
Soviet Union, but what may be more important is the ideologi-
cal threat because the Chinese were competing with the
Soviets for influence in developing areas and for the
allegiance of other Communist states. The Soviet leaders
viewed China as an ascending power, with tremendous material
and human potential. Combining these factors with the
Communist's inherent faith in the inevitability of growth
and development, Soviet doctrine readily justified the
13 6Soviet fear of the Chinese.
135Marshall Shulman, "Toward a Western Philosophy of
Coexistence," U.S. Congress. House. Detente
, p. 547.
Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Moscow's Options in a Changing
World," Problems of Communism (July-August 1972), p. 14.

F. CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND FUTURE EAST EUROPEAN UNREST
There is a great deal of resistance in Eastern Europe to
Soviet control, as amply demonstrated by the independent
policies of Yugoslavia, Romania and Albania, and the uprisings
in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. The two major Soviet
interventions in Eastern Europe demonstrate the importance
that the Soviet Union places on the maintenance of her
satellite empire. Eastern Europe has always been a rather
volatile area, and the pressures of industrialization,
nationalism, and the desire for increased standards of
living will continue to grow in the future. There was great
uncertainty among the Soviet leaders both in 1956 and 1968
concerning the possible responses of the West, and on both
occasions the Soviets gambled on Western non-interference
and won.
The Soviet leaders perceived three major external sources
of possible interference in Eastern European affairs: the
United States, West Germany, and China. Detente and SALT
have tended to lessen, if not completely eliminate the pros-
pect of direct U.S. intervention in this area. Rapproache-
ment with West Germany in the early 1970' s and the CSCE
agreements together met Moscow's goal of legalizing the
status quo in Eastern Europe and lowering the threat from
West Germany. What the Soviet leaders intend to do about
Chinese meddling in this area remains to be seen.
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G. FEAR OF NUCLEAR WAR
One of the major fallacies to avoid when trying to
explain the actions and motivations of the Soviet leaders
is the mirror-image approach, which means ascribing to the
Soviet leaders the same thought patterns and reasoning pro-
cesses as their western counterparts. Nevertheless, it
appears that the Soviet leaders were, and continue to be
just as concerned about the consequences of, and need to
avoid, nuclear war as the leaders of the United States.
Brezhnev, evaluating the results of SALT and the follow-on
Vladivostok agreement, stated that their main significance
was that "they greatly reduce the danger of a nuclear war
137
erupting. " The use of detente as a method for limiting
the possibility of nuclear war can probably be taken at
face value: rational men hoping to avoid irrational destruc-
tion.
H . SUMMARY
Khrushchev ousted Malenkov in 195 5 by siding with the
heavy industry/defense "lobby" and then advocated a slightly
more hard line policy towards the West than did his prede-
cessor. However, once in firm control, he became an out-
spoken advocate of peaceful coexistence. Similarly, imme-
diately after Brezhnev replaced Khrushchev there was a
137
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return to the Soviet hard line policy towards the West.
And once again, after consolidating his position in the
leadership, like Khrushchev, Brezhnev became a firm
supporter of the need for detente with the West. The
factors militating in favor of a renewed emphasis on
relaxing tensions between the Soviet Union and the West
were: the growing Soviet economic problems and the hope
that detente would enable the Soviet Union to solve their
problems by means of western technology and credit; the
Soviet achievment of parity in nuclear weapons and their
desire to utilize detente to prevent a renewed arms race
and thus be able to direct more resources to the solution
of chronic economic problems; the Soviet desire to utilize
detente propaganda to support isolationist and anti-defense
sentiments in the United States in the aftermath of the
end of U.S. involvement in Vietnam; the Soviet desire to
promote their concepts on European security by lessening
the apparent "Soviet threat;" the increasing tensions in
Sino-Soviet relations and the Soviet desire to isolate
China and seek tacit understanding with the U.S. to either
side with the Soviet Union or remain neutral in the event
of a Sino-Soviet war; and finally, the desire on the part
of the Soviet leaders to avoid war or crisis situations




After the signing of the SALT agreements in 197 2 and
the Vladivostok accords in 1974, outward manifestations of
Soviet interest in detente again began to wane. Perhaps
thinking that the U.S. had been lulled into passivity, the
Soviets became deeply involved in supporting revolutionary
groups in Africa and thwarting American sponsored peace
plans for the Middle East. However, now as the second round
of the SALT talks are about to reach fruition, again the
Soviet Union is advocating detente and a decrease in inter-
national tensions.
The ultimate goal of Soviet foreign policy is the destruc-
tion of capitalism and the triumph of Communism on a world
scale. This was the goal of the Bolsheviks in 1917 and
remains the goal of the current leaders of the Soviet Union.
The difference between the approach of 1917 and that of the
post-war era was the means of achieving this goal. The
original revolutionary ideology espoused by the Bolsheviks
called for militancy, spreading of the revolution by force.
This remained a part of the Marxist-Leninist heritage until
the post-Stalin leaders (especially Malenkov and Khrushchev)
came to the realization that nuclear weapons had increased
the risks of spreading Communism by several orders of magni-
tude. Attempts to spread Communism by means of the Red
Army might now result in the nuclear destruction of the
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cradle of the revolution. This realization contributed to
a change in Soviet tactics which was embodied in Khrushchev's
espousal of a policy of "peaceful coexistence" with the
West.
"Peaceful coexistence/ 1 however, was far more complex
than its contextual simplicity indicated. While having great
appeal to the ears of a world tired of war and struggling
under the expenses of defense, it really meant a rechannelling
of the competition between capitalism and socialism into
less visible, but nonetheless extant spheres. This redirec-
tion of Soviet policy was first manifested in 1955 when the
Soviet Union became involved in the sale of arms to Egypt,
the first Soviet arms supplied outside of the Communist bloc.
Seeing that the risks of confrontation with the West were
too great in Europe, the Soviet Union began its policy of
challenging the West in the peripheral areas of the world.
Each period of detente between the Soviet Union and the
West was the result of a combination of factors. The Geneva
detente of 1955 was motivated by a Soviet desire to direct
their attention towards internal and bloc problems while at
the same time neutralizing security threats from the U.S.
strategic arms buildup and the efforts to include West
Germany in NATO. The Camp David detente of 19 59 was in large
measure motivated by Soviet fears of West Germany coming
into possession of nuclear weapons via NATO, and the basing
of U.S. IRBMs in Europe as a part of the NATO defensive
deployment. Sino-Soviet differences were growing at this
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time, and Khrushchev, recovering from the anti-party coup
of 1957, needed a foreign policy triumph to bolster his
position. The Moscow detente of 1963 was a direct result
of the Soviet failure to change the strategic balance by
placing missiles in Cuba. Unable to effect a "quick fix"
to remedy their strategic inferiority, suffering from an
economic slowdown and worried about West German "militarism"
the Soviet Union again felt it in their favor to seek a
lessening of tensions in their relations with the West.
The detente embodied in the 197 2 agreements between the
Soviet Union and the United States was likewise the result
of the confluence of a number of factors: Soviet economic
problems, the need to counter U.S. technological advances
which might affect the strategic balance, the need to come
to an understanding with the West which would allow the
Soviet Union a free hand to deal with China, Soviet per-
ceptions of the effects of a lessening of tension on the
cohesiveness of the NATO alliance, and the opportunity the
Soviet Union saw to exploit U.S. domestic unrest caused in
large part by the unpopularity of the Vietnam war.
There are two common elements which thread their way
through each of these four periods of detente: security
concerns and opportunism. Each period of detente countered
a number of threats to Soviet national security: threats
from arms racing with the U.S., threats from NATO and fear
of West Germany, and threats from Chinese activism. Each
period of detente also gave the Soviet Union the opportunity
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to lessen the perception of the threat to the free world
inherent in Communist ideology, gain access to Western
technology to correct problems in the Soviet economy caused
by the overemphasis on the military sector, and to lull
the general public into a false sense of security through
peace propaganda and the Machiavellian use of terms like
"peaceful coexistence" and "detente" which are not nearly
as innocuous as they are made to sound. These terms are
more like the fabled wolf in sheep's clothing. They have
enabled, and continue to enable the Soviet Union to extend
her influence into Third World areas and support indigenous
socialist and communist movements with little or no western
interference. How can anyone be against "peaceful coexis-
tence?" It is almost contrary to human nature. Unfortuately
,
the terms "peaceful coexistence" and "detente" do not mean
the same in the West as they do in the Soviet Union. To
the Russians, these terms imply a continuation of the struggle
to subvert the West; to Westerners these same terms are
mistakenly understood to imply not only a relaxation of
tension, but a joining together for the common good, an
entente. ^
The common factors described above, security threats and
opportunism, may provide a tool for policymakers attempting
to affect Soviet actions. The Soviet leaders understand
power and its military manifestations, they also seek to
exploit any weaknesses they can find in the free world
alliance system. The implications are clear: the Soviet
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Union can be challenged by a determined Western (U.S.)
military effort incorporating high technology and qualita-
tive advances, and the West must maintain a cohesiveness
unparalleled in its history.
This study has analyzed the factors contributing to
Soviet interest in peaceful coexistence and detente over
the last twenty-five years. It is hoped that the reader
has gained a better understanding of the variables affecting
Soviet interest in peaceful coexistence and detente, and
the real meanings of these terms as used by the Soviet
leaders. Regardless of whether these policies are a tactic
(Stalin) or strategy (Khrushchev and Brezhnev) , they are
aimed at the eventual destruction of our western systems
of government and the fundamental freedoms which we possess.
We must look beyond the words of the Soviet leaders, and
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